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I K T R 0 D U C T I 0 M 
The Gulf is a region of instability and insecurity 
by its very nature and natural indowments. The 
geo-political and strategic significance of the Persian 
Gulf led to the super power rivalry during the cold war 
period. This naturally has both deep and wide impact on 
the politics of the region. The Gulf region is very much 
vulnerable in the context of its enormous oil resources 
and their ramification such as the dependence of the West 
on Gulf oil. 
The security of the Gulf is severely affected by 
political variables like regional and global rivalries 
and the linkage between the Gulf states and other major 
foreign powers in the region. 
The Gulf politics have oftenly discussed at the 
forum of United Nations since its existence due to the 
regional conflicts among the stntos in the rej', ion. Th(> 
Security Council is increasingly called upon to play an 
important role and to actively intervene if lUHess.iry in 
the settlement of disputes, both at the inter-state, and 
intra-state level. 
The Iran-Iraq conflict and latest Gulf crisis in 
the recent past has posed a serious threat and challenge 
to international peace and security as well as the 
authority of the United Nations. 
The Basic purpose of the United Nations is to maintain 
international peace and security. The Chapter VI and VII 
of UN Charter deal, respectively, with the power and 
functions of Security Council in relation to pacific 
settlement of disputes that are likely to endanger the 
international peace and security; and in relation to 
threat to peace, breach of peace and acts of aggression. 
The termination and prevention of armed conflicts 
is not only an important but also in the eyes of general 
public, a particularly identifible task of the United 
Nations. The UN, whose task alway has been to counter 
challenges to peace, was brought into the arena by the 
situation in the Persian Gulf region. The UN was awarded 
the opportunity to overcome the parlysis generally 
demonstrated when confronted by military conflict in the 
past. 
Prior to the Gulf Crises I and II and until the 
breakdown of Soviet Union, the United Nation had to 
operate in the conditions of the two super power 
condominium that greatly hampered its capability to plav 
any effective role in resolving the disputes. The 
transformation in the entire gamut of world politics with 
the end of the cold war facilitated an unprecedented role 
of United Nations, particularly during the Gulf crisis 
1991. 
In fact, the United Nations response to the Gulf 
conflicts, specially to Gulf Crisis 1990-91, was 
unprecedented in the history of international 
organization for its collective enforcement of peace and 
security in the Gulf region. 
The fact still remains that the intra-state 
conflicts are primarily the regional problem and should 
be tackled by the regional parties themselves. But as far 
as the question of the Gulf, it is clear that the 
Western powers are more attentive to -aintain the status 
quo and to uphold their economic interests in the region. 
In this regard the Western powers used International 
Organizations for safeguarding their interests in the 
region. Though the UN actions seem to be largely 
propelled by the US and its allies, ic still could r.ake 
a substantial contribution to peace and security in the 
Persian Gulf region. 
In this context the thene is divided into five 
chapters. The First Chapter -"eals wi'h geo-political and 
strategic significance of the Persian Gulf in world 
politics in the context of super power rivalry. The 
Second Chapter deals with the territorial and island 
disputes between the states of the region which threaten the 
stability and security of the region. The Third Chapter 
deals with the role of the United Nations during the 
eight years long devastative and destructive war between 
Iran and Iraq. It also highlights the impact of war on 
the Gulf region. In the Fourth Chapter, an attempt has 
been made to analyse the Gulf crisis 1990-91 between 
Iraq and Kuwait vis-a-vis the response of United Nations 
in the conflict, the Fifth and final Chapter deals with 
the analysis and assessment of the role of the United 
Nations in the Gulf politics. 
However, this study can not and does not claim to 
be comprehensive or conclusive. The dissertation does not 
attempt to give answer, it endeavours only to raise right 
questions. It is an opening statement in generating 
further discussion through the United Nations on the 
overgrowir^ problems of the region. 
C H A P T E R ; - I 
GEO-POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE 
OF THE PERSIAN GULF 
Geo-politically, the Persian Gulf is integral to 
economic, political and strategic complex to West Asia. 
The Persian Gulf region is surrounded by the disintegrated 
republics of the USSR, the Turkemenistan, Azerbaijan and 
Armenia in the north, the Arabian Sea in the south, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan in the east and the Red Sea, 
Jordan and Syria in the west. The Gulf is about 1000 km in 
length and is between 200 to 300 km wide. It covers an 
area of approximately 226,000 sq.km. On a average, its 
depth is about 35 meters. 
Geographically, the Persian Gulf extends from the 
Gulf of Oman to the Shatt-al-Arab in the north-west. The 
Gulf is a marginal shallow sea of Indian Ocean that Lies 
between Arabian peninsula and south Iran. There are eight 
countries which cover the Gulf, together with the inland 
waters that constitute the Gulf region. 
The inland water of othe Arabian sea known as 
Persian Gulf covers an area of about 97,000 square miles. 
In between the Gulf and the open sea lies the Gulf of 
Oman. The Arabain coast of the Gulf from Iraq to Musandam 
peninsula (the northern province of Oman sei^ irated from 
the remainder of the sultanate by the United Arab 
Emirates) is 1300 miles; the Iranian coast line on the 
north from the Iraqi frontier to the Strait of Hormuz is 
600 miles. On the either side of the inland water lie the 
great plateau of Iran and Arabia. The height of mountain 
chain that skirts the Iranian plateau along the Gulf coast 
varies from 3000-6000 feet above the sea level. The high 
lands stand behind a broad strip of coastal flats and sand 
ridges, their maxinium height is AOOO feet. The Gulf is 
remarkably shallow for so large an area of water. From 
about 80 fathoms at the Strait of Hormuz the floor of the 
Gulf at its deepest is 1800 fathoms off Musqat. Elsewhere, 
the depth measures from 40-50 fathoms. On the whole, it is 
deepest near the Iranian coast than on the southern and 
norther shores . 
Persian Gulf is a part of Indian Ocean and lies in 
Arabian sea. The Gulf contains a number of islands which 
are the main cause of conflict and hostility among the Gulf 
states. The islands which stand in the Strait of Hormuz 
are most significant for oil transport through this route 
to other regions of the globe. The islands of Qishmi are 
important from historical point of view as they had always 
been the cause of rivalry between Persia in the earlier 
times and British rulers of the Gulf, and later between 
Iran and Arabs. The islands in the Strait of Hormuz are 
important from the point of oil shipments through this 
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route. . 
The shallowness of the Gulf except few bays makes 
the southern coast unsuitable for harbours. The most 
important is the bay of Kuwait which in the past served as 
a chief port of the region. Another bay is at Dubai. In 
most of oil ports of Gulf, ships anchor at a distance and 
3 
oil is shipped by pipes. 
The water of the Persian Gulf is surrounded by eight 
littoral states i.e. Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). These 
states are only the oil producing countries of west Asia 
and situated in a very significant geo-strategic location 
around the Gulf. Thus, according to their geo-strategic 
position, they have faced with lot of problems since early 
16th century. 
Arabian peninsula in which all the Gulf states 
situated, covers a very large area and population of the 
region. It is located in South East Asia between East 
Africa on the west, Iran in the East Lavent on the north 
and Arabian sea on the south. Water creates natural 
boundaries in all but the northern part of the peninsula. 
Because of natural water barriers, the collective area of 
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Arab Gulf states have boundaries with the states, i.e. 
Turkey, Jordan and Syria in the north and Yemen in the 
south. 
Iran being situated at the head of the Gulf in the 
north is considered itself a Gulf state. It touches most 
of the Gulf water shores compare to other states of this 
region. It also has a good geographical position and is 
in a position to control the waves of the warm waters of 
this region. Republic of Iraq on the other hand is another 
state which leads the Gulf politics because it has a 
different power structure among the Gulf states, and has a 
traditional enemy with non-Arab state Iran. Saudi Arabia 
is the largest country of the Gulf which extends from the 
Gulf to the Red Sea and touches the territories of all 
other Arab Gulf states. Oman the chokepoint of the Gulf 
lies on the Arabain sea and Indian Ocean itself different 
from the other Gulf states. The location of Oman includes 
the strategic Musandam Peninsula on the Strait of Hormuz. 
Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates also have borders 
with other Arab Gulf states. Bahrain with 33 islands 
situated off the Gulf coast of Saudi Arabia. Qatar is a 
peninsula with an area of 11,000 sqaure kn. in size that 
jjts northward into the Gulf. The United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) consisted of seven emirates of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, 
Dubai, Fujaira, Ras-al-Khaima, Sharjah and Umm-al-Qaiwain 
touches the borders of Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia. 
Kuwait is situated in the north-western side of the Gulf 
and joins the territories of Saudi Arabia and Iraq. 
These eight states that converge on the Gulf vary in 
size, population, natural resources and levels of economic 
and political development. While Saudi Arabia has an area 
of 873,972 sq. miles (over two-third the size of India), 
the smallest state Bahrain covers only 213 square 
miles. Iran is the most populous state in the region 
which have over forty million population where as Qatar 
has the least inhabitants on its land among the regional 
states. 
The Gulf region is an important area from the point 
of its strategic setting. From antiquity till the middle 
ages the Gulf served as najor route for maritime trade. 
The main port of this trade in the Gulf was Basra. Thus, 
for its geo-political importance and significance for the 
world trade and maritima commerce the Gulf has been 
coveted by all mojor powers of Che world including Soviet 
Union. 
The Gulf have also remained an important factor in 
ancient times of Mesopotaraian civilization from the point 
of view of military, economic and trade route. The area 
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gained importance for the first time by Alexander the 
Great in third century B.C., as to link western and 
Eastern parts of his empire. Thus it was Alexander the 
Great who at first, looked the Persian Gulf as a bridge 
between two major Asian and Europe continents. 
Later the Persain Gulf became the hot bed of 
colonical rivalry because of its global strategic setting 
during colonical domination in 16th century. 
The Gulf was the scene of feverish rivalry among 
the maritime powers of Europe from beginning of the 16th 
o 
century until the end of the second world war. Portugese 
were the first to colonise the Persian Gulf with the 
capturing of Bahrain 1507 and Hormuz 1514. During colonial 
rivalry Great Britain also dominated over other naritime 
powers in the region. 
The Persian Gulf region has acquired geo-strategic 
importance not only because it is on the crossroads of the 
east and the west and the north and south but also 
because it dominates an important sector of the Indian 
Ocean which become a major arena of super power rivlry. 
The Gulf region is also important in the context of its 
vast oil resources and the dependence of the west on the 
Gulf oil and other natural resources. The security of the 
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Gulf is also affected by political factors like regional 
and global rivalries and the relation between Gulf states 
and foreign powers. 
The location of Gulf has commanding strategic 
approaches to Asia, Africa and Europe. Indeed the Gulf 
gradually came into prominence with the discovery of oil 
during early 20th century. The Strait of Hormuz Is an 
important waterway which adds the region very 
politico-strategic significance. 
Today, in the western as well as Soviet perception of 
international security, the Gulf occupies a position of 
importance second only to that of the central theatre of 
9 
the original cold war Eruope. The Gulf assumes this 
geo-strategic importance primarily because of its enormous 
oil wealth and its profound impact on the economies of the 
developed world. About 30% the oil imported by USA, 607o by 
West Europe and 76% by Japan come from this region. The 
security impact of the Gulf oil has been no less. It is 
not merely the economies but also the defence of Europe 
that require Gulf oil in order to sustain their economic 
and defer.ce requirements. 
Oil Factor: 
In the basin of the Gulf region lies the world s 
largest oil reserves. About 58.60 percent oil deposits are 
12 
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located around the Gulf. The significance of the Gulf 
oil, in turn, derives from three basic factors - its 
abundance, its gro-.-:ing demand in the world market, and the 
enormous economic and financial power, through its 
13 
commercial exploitation to the Gulf scates. Saudi Arabia 
is the gaint ar.ong Gulf states in oil production 
subsequently followed by Kuwait and Iran. 
The Gulf area is the largest oil exporter to the 
world market and hence, in no other region of the world, 
there exists a politico-economic and strategic 
relationship between arms and any other commodity as oil. 
Oil is most and most important commodity that makes 
the vulnerability of region to the west. It shows the 
interdependency and mutual cooperation in socio-political 
and economic field on each other. Thus, the destination of 
oil supply, rather than the commodity itself has given a 
strategic dimension to oil. Thus the importance of Persian 
Gulf area is bound to speed up despite the lessened 
quantity of oil exports from the region in comparison to 
1970s and 1980s. 
Besides,the above mentioned quantitative aspect, the 
qualitative aspect of Gulf oil puts the region on top of 
other oil producing regions. The low sulphur content in 
Gulf oil is least harmful to the environment. This factor 
led USA, West European States and Japan to prefer Gulf oil 
13 
.. c u . 1 6 
over tne oil or other regions. 
Gulf oil adorns West Asia with an added strategic 
significance because oil supply is interr.ingly linked with 
the politics. Oil embargo associated with Arab-Israeli 
conflict or the Palestinian issue. In other words, West 
Asia is the "grey area" endowed with abundance of oil and 
"political vaccumes". 
Politics in the Persian Gulf: 
The western interests in Gulf first traced back by 
Maritir.e Powers to early sixteenth century, although the 
involvement of super powers in the Gulf is started only in 
the twentieth century. 
From the beginning of the 16th century until the 
second world war, the Gulf was the place of colonial 
rivalry among the Maritime powers of Europe. In the era of 
European competition and conflict in the Gulf with other 
colonial powers British dominated over others and 
established complete paramourtcy in the region. British 
activity in the Gulf was increasingly directed towards the 
establishment, maintenance and policing of a "zone of 
influence covering the western land and sea approaches to, 
and for the protection of the British possessions in 
18 
India'.' In consolidating their position in the Gulf 
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region British had gone through a number of treaties with 
local Sheikhs and Amirs which gave them paramount powers. 
Similarly, they had concluded treaties with Trucial chiefs 
and brought them under her protection. By these treaties 
and agreements Britain consolidated its position in the 
region. In the late 19th century, Britain concluded 
several treaties with Muscat, Oman, Qatar,Bahrain, Kuwait 
and Trucial coast sheikhdoms to achieve aforementioned 
objectives. To enforce these agreements British maintained 
a naval contingent, first at Ras-al-Khyma and later at 
Basidu on the island of Qishm, and a Resident at Bushire. 
In 1933, when the British government ended the trade 
monopoly of East India company, the direction of the Gulf 
affairs first passed into the hand of the Government of 
Bombay, and after the 1857 Indian revolt, into the 
19 Government of India. To hold their domination and 
possession over India, British fought seven years war 
(1756 - 1763) with France. French were expelled out from 
the Gulf and British became the single power to protect 
their interests in Indian Ocean region. 
The established British naval paramountcy in the 
region came into conflict with the apprehension of Russian 
desire to expand in this direction. The British failed to 
come over Russian attitude to acquire territories of 
Persia. 
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The German increasing interests and initiatives 
compelled Russia and British to compose their rivalries 
which resulted in the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, and 
through this convention, Britain undertook to accommodate 
Russatn interests in the Gulf region and adjoining 
on 
areas. In this way Britain secured their domination in 
the region till the outbreak of world war I. 
After the defeat of Axis Power in world war I, most 
of Gulf states were given mandate to Britain and France by 
Mandate Commission of League of Nations. Besides,Palestine, 
Britain secured mandatory power over Iraq and Jordan and 
France over Syria and Labanon. British made a special 
relationship with Oman while Qatar and Bahrain were under 
British protectorates. Kuwait came under the British 
Military protection till its independence in 1961. The 
UAE, earlier known as Trucial coast remained under British 
tutelage. Saudi Arabia, the only Gulf state, remained free 
from the British domination and control. By the end of 
19th and early 20th century even Iran came under the 
influence and control of both Czarist Russia and 
Britain."^^ 
All those above factors were responsible for British 
con,trol and domination over the Gulf region. It is self 
evident that for over a hundred years Britain continuously 
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maintained a Pax Britanica in the region until they 
decided to leave the region in 1968. 
Not only from the point of view of political 
dominance, the Britishers were also closely associated 
with and beneficiary of the oil boom that took place in 
the Gulf during the days of oil discoveries. Britain, in 
this connection had acquired oil concessions in Iran as 
early as 1909 and established the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company) in 1909. It acquired concession to explore and 
drill oil in a large area which embraced roughly 600, 000 
square miles of land in Iran. A similar concession was 
also acquired in Iraq through the Turkish Petroleum 
Company (later known as Anglo-Iraqi Oil Company) securing 
control over 171,000 square miles of the land in Iraqi 
territory. However, according to the Red Line Agreement of 
1928, Britain had to share these oil concessions with the 
United States by accepting it as a partner in this oil 
deal.^^ 
The oil contest soon led to the partition of the 
Gulf region between large companies of the west. In Iran 
the major concessionare was Britain. Iraqi oil came under 
the control of TPC, a multi-national oil company in which 
USA, Britain, France and Dutch participated. American 
group operated in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait's 
17 
oil was handled by a Joint Anglo-American group, 
respectively. Qatar and other sheikhdoms were dominated by 
multi-national Iraqi Petroleum company's subsidiary 
agencies. However, Britain having bilateral treaties with 
the Gulf sheikhdoms and Trucial chiefs could still 
23 preserve exclusive facilities for itself. 
British presence continued with consolidation of her 
position which finally led to virtual British monopoly of 
foreign control in the area and continued until their 
independence. The 1968 announcement of Britain's 
decision to withdraw from the Gulf by 1971 threw wide open 
one of the world's richest and most strategic regions and 
25 
created a dangerous power vacuum in the Gulf. 
Super Powers in the Gulf: 
Super power politics in the Gulf revolves around the 
oil and its strategic location. Highlighting the strategic 
interest of the United States in this region, Professor 
Robert Tucker of John Hopkins University declared: "Almost 
as certainly as did Europe in the 1940's, the Gulf 
provides the critical source of conflict between United 
States and the Soviet Union."^^ In 1981, a Council of 
Foreign Relations a study published and stated that the 
Gulf presents the single most complex policy task for the 
18 
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United States in meeting Soviet expansionist pressure. 
The single and foremost interest of the United States in 
the region is to safeguard the free and uninterrupted flow 
of oil to the Western Bloc. To make a foothold in this 
region, America established a close relationship with the 
traditional and conservative monarchies of Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. 
Soviet interest mainly used to be determined in the 
Gulf by the geographical proximity of Soviet Union to the 
region. Soviet policy had not directly related to Gulf oil. 
The Soviet aim, besides seeking an outlet to nevigable 
sea, had remained confined to developing the capacity to 
obstruct the supply of oil to the west by promoting 
28 
radical regimes in the oil-rich states in the Gulf. 
Precisely, the super power policy in this region, in the 
fifties, sixties and upto recent Gulf crisis evolved in 
the form of reaction to each others political and 
29 diplomatic overtures in and around the oil states. 
However, in the recent Gulf war, policies of both super 
power have witnessed a changed to a great diversion to 
that of previous one. 
US Foreign Policy Initiatives in the Gulf; 
After the world war I, USA looked upon the 
geo-strategic significance of west Asia particularly that 
19 
of Persian Gulf because of its geographical location and 
vast oil resources. 
Firstly and foremostly, the Persian Gulf is 
important to USA due to its location in the global 
strategic setting. It comprises an area of 97,000 square 
miles, is surrounded by the former Soviet Union, 
Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian sea, Yemen, the 
Red Sea, Jordan and Syria. Hence, due to its central 
location, Persian Gulf works as a cockpit of the US world 
. , . T .30 
wide involvement. 
A number of enter-related factors attracts the US to 
the geo-strategy of this region. Its proximity with the 
erstwhile USSR and Europe, its importance as a plateform 
of military action against the industrial USSR and its 
significance as an area of super power conflict and 
competition. 
From Truman's administration to Reagan's, the region 
was given primary importance for containment policy of USA 
against Soviet Union. For this,US chalked out many 
programmes so as to keep away Soviet Union as far as 
possible from this region. 
With the outbreak of world war II in 1939, the Gulf 
owing to its geo-political and strategic importance and 
20 
the vast oil reserves became vulnerable to Nazi and 
32 Fascist expansionist attitude. At the end of world war 
II, and the defeat of Axis Powers gave opportunity to 
United States to take interest in this region. For gaining 
control and foothold in the region USA got a number of 
bases at Oman, Bahrain and United Arab Emirates to protect 
the region from Soviet Union's strategy of getting control 
33 
over the rich oil-fields. 
These bases are also vital for grouiia, aerial and 
naval strategies. For the bases provide security to the 
ships moving from the Mediterranean to the Indian 
Ocean. 
US permanent military build up and presence in the 
Indian Ocean dates back to 1949 when it established its 
Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) in the Persian Gulf and 
stationed a task force of one flagship and two destroyers 
at Bahrain-an arrangement renewed with the government of 
Bahrain in 1971 after British withdrawal ."^ ^ 
Most of the requirements of oil of West European 
countries, USA and Japan, come through this complex and 
crucial region. Hence, the security of the trade water and 
the oil producing countries is the single largest factor 
behind the US interests in the area. The US directly 
intervened in Iran-Iraq war in 1987 when Iran threatened 
21 
to strangulate its oil supply by attacking oil tankers of 
the Persian Gulf states. The US military involvement in 
the latest Persian Gulf crisis centred around the security 
of oil supply. 
The United States has clear strategic interest and 
objective in the Persian Gulf. The US has both 
conventional and strategic nuclear military interest in 
the Gulf. The US vital interests include the preservation 
of western access to Persian Gulf oil resources and the 
38 
maintenance of local geographical balance. 
Geographically J the area - the buffer zone in the US 
-USSR balance of power, was important to US during the 
39 
cold war period for the containment of the USSR. The 
military alliance between Iran and the West was considered 
strategically necessary as part of West's grand design 
vis-a-vis the communist block. In the past the US arms 
in the region and their coordination with the US forces 
stationed at Persian Gulf bases also threatened the USSR's 
expansionism. 
The concept of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in the 
Indian Ocean has been developed in the context of the 
Iranian revolution of 1979 with potential threat to oil 
supply lines. The establishment of RDF and the massive 
consolidation facilities at Diego Garcia are all regard 
22 
towards the use of coersive diplomacy and to ensure the 
43 
sustained flow of oil to the western industrialized countries. 
The Persian Gulf thus has been vital to the US for 
its regional and global involvement and also holds the key 
to the US future strategic postures. And herein lies the 
immense strategic value of region which even transcends its 
economic value. 
Further number of inter-related factors; growing 
production of West Asian oil, growing share of oil in the 
energy consumption, economic growth depicting oil reserves 
of West European states, oil embargo in 1973 and the 
subsequent price rise and the USSR threat altogether 
placed West Asia prominently in the USA's oil strategy. 
By 1980, more than half of US requirements of oil 
have been imported from the Gluf area. As far the West 
European countries and Japan, they face a far more serious 
problem because of their rising consumption and near-total 
dependence of imported Gulf oil. 
Vulnerability of the West to the oil embargo or an 
oil shock, the Soviet threat and regional war, keeps the 
USA preoccupied with this region. Nixon Doctrine was, to 
a considerable extent, concerned with the safety of oil. 
President Carter, Reagan and Bush followed the same policy 
23 
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of Nixon, as far as, oil supply to US is concerned. For 
US, just availability and access of the Persian Gulf oil 
is not sufficient, but it has to be made available on her 
49 
own terms of interests. 
In January 1980, President Carter declared, that any 
attempt by any outside force to gain control of the 
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault, will 
be repelled by any means necessary, including military 
force. It is for these reasons that the US policies in the 
region are based on what may be termed, coersive 
diplomacy. 
After the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Soviet 
Union occupation of Afghanistan, the security of US has 
been severely threatened and also lessened the domination 
of USA in Gulf region. In the wake of these events, US 
turned to give more attention to one its "Twin Pillers" 
Saudi Arabia, in terms of liberal, military and economic 
aid. In the latest Gulf crisis US and its allied were more 
interested in the supply of oil for them than to prevent 
Iraq from gaining control over Gulf oil fields. 
Soviet Forlegn Policy Initiatives in the Gulf: 
Soviet interests and objectives in the Gulf should 
be seen in the context of its global strategy and instinct 
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development of Soviet position in West Asia. 
To begin with the direction of Soviet Union interest 
in the Persian Gulf follows the same route as that 
travelled by the Britishers, the French, and the 
Americans. If the oil factor is excluded, the Soviet 
Union's strategic interest in the Persian Gulf was really, 
52 greater than the USA and the west. 
Besides in the past geographical contiguity, the 
ethnic, cultural and lingual ties between the peoples of 
Northern Persian Gulf and six adjacent Muslim Republics of 
the erstwhile USSR, affected the Soviet security. 
Political, cultural and social trends across the borders 
made a great impact on USSR's domestic and external 
security. The Persian Gulf was the avenue of the USSR's 
policy of strategic negativism. In the words of Admiral 
Sergic C.Goreskov " ...the presence of our ships ... ties 
the imperialist hands and deprives them of opportunity 
freely to interefere in the peoples internal affairs." 
The Persian Gulf, being adjoining to USSR had been 
the most strategically important to it. In this context, 
USSR had acquired some land and naval bases in Iraq 
Syria, South Yemen and Euthopia, to control the oil 
sea-lanes and installations against USA that could resort 
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to severe retaliation. These bases and facilities which 
USSR had acquired in the Persian Gulf, had also useful to 
it to support its naval forces in Indian Ocean-Arabian 
sea. The interests of Soviet Union in the region probably 
had been to match with the interests of USA and west's 
political, economic and strategic interests in Indian 
Ocean and particularly in the Gulf area. 
Since the establishment of Israel state on the Arab 
land, USSR firstly entered into politics of the region in 
1956, when Arabs were attacked by Anglo-French-Israeli 
armed forces. This Arab-Israeli conflict gave USSR 
a deep foothold in the region. During 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war USSR supplied very huge amount of weapons to Arabs for 
fighting against their enemy Israel. In its support to 
Arab cause in the West Asia, it gained more confidence and 
domination over radical regimes and revolutionary groups 
of Gulf area. 
The Persian Gulf was starting point of the USSR's 
southward expansion. The Soviet expansion in the area kept 
it away from the security threat of outsiders. The 
Soviet-Iraq treaty of 1972 extended USSR's influence at 
5 5 the head of the Persian Gulf. 
Furhter, the overthrow of Shah of Iran-one of the 
most strong allied of USA in the region, and the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan, weakened the US position on the 
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one hand and enhanced the Soviet position on the other. 
These development played a very crucial role to reduce the 
US control and domination in this region. 
In the wake of intra-regional tensions and the 
subsequent naval buildup by super powers, Soviet President 
Brezhnev proposed a D octrine of Peace and Security for 
Persian Gulf during his December 1980 visit to India. The 
proposed five-point doctrine called for an agreement not 
to set up foreign military bases in the Persian Gulf area 
and on adjacent islands, not to deploy nuclear or other 
weapons of mass destruction there, not to use force 
against the countries of Persian Gulf areas, not to 
interfere in their internal affairs and to respect the 
non-aligned states of the Gulf. The plan as envisaged 
was directed against the US bases and her fast building up 
on RDF, which was to be used against Soviet Union in the 
area. Thus, the foreign policy of the erstwhile Soviet 
Union in the region had been marked with great caution and 
restraint. 
Thus, from the point of view of international and 
regional politics, no other sub-region of the Indian Ocean 
is so much significant as that of Persian Gulf. Although, 
the cold war has come to an end and the super power 
rivalry is no more there, however the Persian Gulf region 
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would be be significant for industrialized and advanced 
countries due to its economic and strategic assets. In the 
years to come, the international community would have 
more expectations in terms of oil from the region, and 
thus the oil asset would further increase the significance 
of the region. 
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CHAPTER -II 
TERRITORIAL AND ISLAND DISPUTES IN THE PERSIAN GULF 
Territorial and Island disputes are not a new 
phenomenon. It is as old as the existence of the state 
system. Disputes and conflicts have been a natural 
phenomena in international politics. 
During the last couple of years the Persian Gulf 
has presented a paradoxical, rather quixotic, picture in 
terms of policy and search for security. The two segments 
influence each other and commulatively they have 
determined the course of social political developments in 
the eight independent states in the Persian Gulf. There 
are several geographical, historical and cultural 
determinants which have provided a semblance of unity and 
continuity. It is apparent that these states in the 
Persian Gulf are part of a single geographical land mass 
except Iran. For long time, the Persian Gulf enjoyed 
ethnic, social, cultural and economic unity and its 
various territorial segments were inhabited and 
administered by a plethora of , a pastoral tribes. By the 
end of the 19th century, Britain not only elbowed out 
other European competitors but it also established itself 
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as the paramount protecting power in this significant 
region through a number of agreements V7ith the dominant 
tribal sheikhs. By the British connivance, the concept of 
abiding control over territories was impregnated and this 
became the rough blue-print of boundary limits of the 
present day states of the Persian Gulf region. 
The issues of demarcating state boundaries in the 
region were difficult and crucial because of the 
conflicting claims which had no fixed accepted basis. Nor 
were there numerous identifiable geographical features 
like mountains, lakes or rivers in the flat and barren 
desert land which could serve as territorial land marks. 
In such a land scape, isolated groves, date trees or 
oases became covated object of possession and hence 
territorial disputes. The discovery of oil in the barren 
and waterless land not only transformed the fortunes of 
bedouins but more important it also intensified the 
scrabable for oil containing regions thereby sharpening 
and complicating the claims and disputes over 
territories. 
British political interference in the region gave 
her immense leap of advantage. Before the discovery of 
oil, British had entered into a comprehensive 
protectorate system particularly on the eastern seaboard 
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of the Persian Gulf. It was primarily done to ensure the 
security of the sea route of Indian Ocean as well as 
Persian Gulf. The British were able to prevail over the 
sheikhdoms to keep their conflicting claims in the cold 
storage. This method was continued through the first 
decade of the 20th Century. The disputes were temporised 
either by external mediation or through the power of 
purse. During the 1960s, a number of attempts were made 
at the bilateral level as well as through third party 
mediation to resolve the persisting disputes, over the 
borders and territories in the region. 
The year 1971 was a landmark in the political 
development in the Persian Gulf because of British 
withdrawal from the Indian Ocean subsequently ending her 
domination from the region. This policy shift also 
resulted in the emergence of many independent states in 
the region. Although these states were given 
international recognition and admitted to United Nations 
but 5 there was a serious problem of their statehood since 
the borders of the states neither defined nor demarcated 
from another. 
During the last few years, partlcvil n r 1 y In I'^M'i 
some significant territorial disputes among the ruler were 
erupted. The resurrection of these disputes should be 
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assessed in the contemporary regional scenario. These 
disputes could be interpreted as demonstration of the 
newly acquired political, security and military sinews in 
pursuit of assertion of one's position on expanding 
sphares of influence. There one may highlight some 
important recently erupted border and territorial 
disputes which became the cause of conflicting situation 
in the region as UAE-Iran dispute, Qatar - Bahrain 
dispute, Saudi Arabia - Qatar dispute and Saudi Arabia -
Yemen dispute. 
UAE - Iran Dispute : 
The 35 square miles island of Abu Musa is situated 
in the waters of Persian Gulf, some 35 miles off the 
Sharjah coast and some 43 miles off the Israman coast. 
Opposite, that is within the waters of UAE side of the 
UAE - Iran median line, some 24 miles north west of Abu 
Musa lies the island of Lesser Tunb, further in same 
direction Greater Tunb. Abu Musa is characterised by deep 
waters providing good anchorage and exclusive deposites 
of red ironoxide. The population of Abu Musa is around 
2000, most of whom are branches of the Arab tribes 
inhabiting Sharjah. The main occupations of the islands 
population are trade and fishing. 
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The tiff between Iran and UAE which erupted in 
April 1992 was the revival of long standing dispute 
which had been kept into cold storage since 1971. In 
October 1971, Iranian armed forces captured the three 
significant islands immediately after British ended its 
direct rule and withdrew from lower Persian Gulf, and 
these islands handed over to the Trucial Sheikhs. Both 
Iran and UAE have used their claims to the islands on 
historical grounds. The British in 1902 recognised Abu 
Musa and islands of two Tunbs as belonging to the Qasimi 
Shaikhs of Sharjah and Ras-al-Khayma respectively. Two 
years later, some Iranian customs guards appeared on the 
islands, but retreated strongly following energetic 
British representation in Tehran. The British continued 
to regard Abu Musa and the two Trubs respectively to 
2 
Sharjah and Ras-al-Khayma. 
The ruler of Sharjah concluded an agreement with 
Iran for the future status of Abu Musa on 29 Nov. 1971, 
allowing Iran to occupy the part of the Abu Musa, while 
salvaging Sharjah's sovereignty over the rest. 
The agreement, made public on 29 November 1971, 
stipulated that while the islands civilian population 
would remain under Sharjah administrative jurisdiction. 
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a specific part of island would be placed under Iran's 
military control. Further more Iran would render 
financial assistance to Sharjah worth £ 1.5 million a 
year until the latter's annual oil income reached £ 3 
million. On November 30, 1971, the day agreement came 
into force, the Iranian troops landed on the Tumb islands 
3 
and occupied them without any resistance. 
The problem erupted in April 1992 when the Iranian 
authorities, under security concern evicted 100 UAE 
nationals from the island of Abu Musa which was run 
jointly by Iran and the Emirate of Sharjah, and closed 
the school, the disalination plant and police post on the 
UAE controlled part of the island. Soon, thereafter the 
President of UAE, Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan Al-Nahiyan 
notified to his GCC parnters about the incident. A GCC 
official told the Press on 15th April 1992, that "it was 
a serious situation but no one will take action unless it 
is requested by the UAE". Iran replied the UAE response 
by accusing that latter supported Iraq during Iran - Iraq 
war. Iran further demanded that either the UAE should 
compensate Iran for war time loses or that Abu Dhabi and 
Saudi Arabia should reduce their oil production. It 
vehmently annoyed by the UAE as a flagrant violation of 
1971 Sharjah - Iran agreement which provided for 
conditional joint ownership of island. The problem became 
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more complicated subsequently when UAE added the 
ownership of the two Tunbs to its complaint. There is 
basic legal difference in the status of Abu Musa and the 
two Tunbs. Whereas Sharjah signed an agreement which 
provided Iran to occupy specified part of Abu Musa, the 
Imperial Iranian Armed Forces landed on Greater and 
Lesser Tunbs islands claiming their ownership as her 
historical right. But these islands were under the 
control of Ras-al-Khayma. 
On 11 April 1992, the Iranian Foreign Minister Ali 
Akbar Vilayati denied the whole story which was reported 
to GCC by UAE, to a Press Conference and reported to have 
confirmed that Arabs were still staying in Abu Musa and 
were no plan to deport them. But on 22 April 1992, Tehran 
Times, in its commentary revealed that the "Sharjah 
Sheikh was recently told that non-UAE citizen wishing to 
travel to Abu Musa should obtain a special card which can 
not be considered as equivalent to a visa permit". 
In fact the Tehran Times went on to add a mild 
threat to UAE, terming Emirate ruler's response to the 
incident as hasty and vociferous. The paper also reported 
that Iran expelled only non- UAE nationals who were 
working there, after they refused to exchange their UAE 
residence papers. 
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The authority of Iran at Abu Musa, have again 
challenged the authority of UAE over these islands, 
demanding that non-UAE guests of resident would require 
to obtain visas from the Iranian authorities before they 
are permitted to go on island. The issue came alive when 
Iran expelled 100 teachers from Abu Musa and demanded 
that the passengers, most of whom were woked on the 
island for several years, must obtain an Iranian visa and 
should carry an Iranian identity card. This act of Iran 
has been challenged by UAE which affirms that, it is the 
violation of the agreement of 1971 between them. The 
agreement provided, that Sharjah retains the right of 
sovereignty over the land and agreed part of which is 
Occupied by Iran. 
As far the UAE - Iran row is concerned, two views 
could be held» One that it was a purely bilateral dispute 
which could be resolved accordingly. The other that it 
was deliberately precipitate under invisible 
extra-regional promting . In the first which involved to 
the prospects of security and stability, a number of 
attempts ^ 3 made to reach a settlement. Three rounds 
of bilate. I talks were held till September 1992. 
However, nr conclusive result could be achieved. The 
other approach tended to internationalise the issue with 
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grave prospects. The issue was widened when it was 
discussed at the forum of GCC, the Demascus Declaration 
States, and the League of Arab States and there were some 
indication of its reference to the united Nations. 
This dispute is apparently different from the 
other disputes in the Persian Gulf in three ways. It is 
not a border dispute but a purely terretorial dispute. 
There is no element of definition and demarcation of 
border lines. It is an issue between Arab and non-Arab. 
The GCC and the Demascus Declaration states in an 
official statement expressed its "extreme concern" at 
Iranian action in Abu Musa. Arab League also condemned 
the aggression of Iran against these islands. More 
important, it is decided to refer the case, which gravely 
endangers the security and statbility of the region, to 
United Nations. These three groups also supported the 
rights of UAE over Abu Musa. 
The Ministerial Council of GCC on 9 September, 
1992 issued a statement and expressed extreme concern 
against Iranian action in Abu Musa, and strongly 
condemned the measures which shake the stability and 
security of the region. It also calls upon the Islamic 
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Republic of Iran to respect the memorandum of 
understanding which was mutually agreed by Sharjah and 
Iran stressing that the Abu Musa island had been the 
responsibility of UAE alone. 
The council also expresses its deep regret that 
Iran has taken unjustifiable measures against UAE, and 
calls upon Iran to follow the pricniples, that are based 
on agreed principles between two sides to build relation 
on the basis of compliance with international respect for 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of 
states, non-interference in international affairs, 
renunciation of the resort to or threat using force and 
settlement of disputes by peaceful means. Further more it 
hoped that Iran would retreat to its position regarding 
the issue and would give back to UAE her full sovereignty 
over Abu Musa. 
The Foreign Ministers of Demascus Declaration 
States on 10 September 1992 met at Doha regarding the 
incident by Abu Musa and made an statement. It observed : 
"The ministers of Iran should honour the memorandum 
of understanding reached between Sharjah and Iran, 
affi rming the Abu Musa island as the responsibility of 
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UAE government when the UAE federation was set up. The 
ministers also expressed their rejection of Islamic 
Republic of Iran's occupation of two Tunbs which also 
belonged to UAE". 
The Declaration also expressed its hope that Iran 
would go back on its stance on this issue, and reiterate 
its full support to UAE in this regard. 
On 14 September, the Arab League Council met in 
Cairo and condemned Iran's aggression against the island 
of Abu Musa and two Tunbs. According to a MENA dispatch 
the Council asserted UAE sovereignty over the island and 
decided to forward the case of Iran's violation, which 
gravely endangers the security and stability of the 
region, to United Nation. 
Iran reacted immediately to each of the statement 
asserting its position, over the issue and described the 
issue as "deep seated plan with the sole objective of 
sowing the seeds of discord between Iran and Persian Gulf 
states." The unidentified Iranian sources did not mention 
o 
as to who was 'behind the scene'. Iran further responded 
to the GCC statement on 10 September 1992 when Morteza 
Sarmadi, the Iranian foreign minister told to IRNA that 
the statement "was a blatant violation of good 
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neighbourely relations and spirit of understanding and 
cooperation." The statement of Demascus Declaration 
states was considered as a flagrant contradiction of good 
neighbourliness among the countries of the region. The 
statement of Arab League was dismissed as irresponsible 
stance. President Rafsanjani justified Iran's action in 
the following terms "... we have only beefed up security 
to prevent seditious incidents of which there were many 
signs." 
A plausible explanation for Iran's action might be 
to probe GCC states, solidarity, capabilities and 
intentions after their recent security arrangement and 
those of their western allies. As such the United 
States adapted a low profile on the UAE - Iran dispute. 
Although the US described Iran's action in Abu Musa as 
high-handed assertion of authority, and welcomed the 
rinii stand ui the GCC,Demascus Declaration and of Arab 
League taken on the issue. 
In spite of occasional recrimination, both sides 
put emphasis on "cementing bilaterial relation between 
the two Muslim . .id neighbouring countries" through 
peaceful negotiations, thus three round talks on 27 & 28 
September 1992 wen convened in Abu Dhabil-'- It was agreed 
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in talks to continue the next round in Tehran. In the 
Tehran meeting the UAE insisted an including the two Tunb 
islands in the agenda J Iran' considered it as closed issue. 
Iran left open for negotiations without any preconditions 
and within the framework of respect for the national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and good neighbourly 
12 
relations. Since there was no meeting point in the two 
positions, the talks were called off. In spite of the 
Iranian version its relations with the UAE were 
13 improving. 
The other option open to UAE, if,; it wanted to 
internationalize the issue, was to take the dispute to 
the Internationa court of Justice (ICJ). For that consent 
of both disputed parties would be imperative. In any case 
the Iranian agreement is necessary if the dispute has to 
be submitted to the court. The matter has come to a stand 
still at this point. 
Qatar - Bahrain Dispute : 
The subject of territorial disputes between Qatar 
and Bahrain are over the Hawar islands (situated about 
one and a half miles off the coast of Qatar), Zubarah (a 
strip on the north-west of the Qatari peninsula), and two 
coral reefs of Fashtal - Dibal and Qitat-al-Jaroah 
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(situated in the waters between the two Sheikhdoms) . Since 
1967 unsuccessful mediation efforts done by Saudi Arabia 
between the two countries. Inspite of mediation by Saudi 
Arabia, the problem persisted. The Bahraini claim to 
sovereignty over these lands has gravely affected the 
independence of two states. 
The ruler of Qatar raised the question of 
sovereignty over these islands during his visit to 
Bahrain in March 1967 (i.e. before the attainment of 
independence by the two countries in 1971). The matter 
was discussed within the framework, of an offshore 
boundary settlement, and Qatar insisted on obtaining the 
islands ownership, but Bahrain did not agree to this 
demand of Qatar. 
In 1965, Bahrain granted a concession to the 
continental oil company (Bahrain) over these islands and 
its surrounding waters. Bahrain's Minister of Industry 
and Development Yusuf-al-Shawari stated on 1 March 1980, 
that the islands and its waters governed by a concession 
agreed between the government of Bahrain and a group of 
US companies which were planning to drill a new 
"1 / 
experimental well in search of oil. 
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Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Khalifa, the Qatar's Minister of 
Finance and Petroleum replied on March 4, 1980 that, all 
geographical, historical, legal and logical indication 
categorically proved that these islands constitue an 
indivisible part of Qatar since they are situated within 
its territorial waters. Further more, he added that 
Bahrain had nothing to support its claim of sovereignty 
over these islands except a British decision made in 
1939, which Qatar considered "null and void", since it 
contradicted the basic norms of International Law 
governing such matters. The Minister also accused 
Yusuf-al-Shawari of disregarding the fact that there was 
an agreed mediation being conducted by a big sister 
(Saudi Arabia) for solving the dispute and he 
subsequently declared 'that Qatar was keen to safeguard 
its close fraternal relation with Bahrain and hoped that 
the two countries would settle the dispute in a manner 
that would restore right in accordance with the principle 
15 
of justice and law. On March 7, 1980 Saudi Arabia again 
mediated between two states in order to prevent and 
resolve the dispute from becoming worsen. When a claim 
raised by the Sheikh of Bahrain relating to rights in 
Zubarah, on the northern coast of Qatar, on the ground 
that it was his ancestral home, the issue became more 
complicated. The claim was not regarded as territorial 
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but as one's jurisdiction over the subjects of a state in 
another territory. In the opinion of Sheikh o£ Bahrain 
that in the absence of any written agreement by both the 
two states, the problem will remain unsettled. 
The GCC Ministerial Council, meeting in Riyadh on 
March 7 - 9 , 1982 requested Saudi Arabia to continue its 
mediation to resolve he dispute because Qatar government 
had strongly protested in March 1982 against the decision 
of Bahrain to name "Hawar" for a new warship. 
In the meantime, the relation between two capitals 
further deteriorated to the extent that GCC feared of a 
war between them on the Hawar islands. This time the two 
antagonist agreed that King Fahad bin Abdul Aziz should 
mediate and that in case the problem was not bilaterally 
resolved betwen two countries the matter should refer to 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in December 1990. 
Unfortunately the Saudi mediation failed. Qatar 
took the initiative in referring the issue to the ICJ on 
8 July 1991. Qatar requested the court to uphold its 
claim of sovereignty over the islands, in accordance with 
the provisions of International Law. Bahrain submitted a 
rebuttal of Qatar's claims and requested to the highest 
court of world to look into broader issue of sea and 
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land boundaries and that both the parties should be 
represented at the Hague together in order to reach a 
settlement of the issue. On October 11, 1991 the ICJ 
accepted the case and directed both Qatar and Bahrain to 
submit their cases in detail on February 10, 1992, and 
June 11, 1992 respectively, and to defend their positions 
on 28 and 29 September 1992. There will be long 
arguement to their cases by both the sides, as court 
would take final decision which shall be binding on both 
the sides. 
Despite Bahrain and Qatar desperately looked 
outside the GCC framework but within the region for 
seeking support and counter balance. The Prime Minister 
of Bahrain was the first man who calls for improving 
relation with Iraq since Gulf crisis. He made a 
conciliatory gesture by sending greetings to Saddam 
Husain on the occasion of Eid-al-Adha. It was reported 
that official of the two countries made contacts during 
the Earth Summit at Rio-de Jenario in June 1992. Qatar 
was not far behind to take the similar measure, and drew 
a satisfaction by looking at Iran for sustenance. Thus, 
if the constituent states of GCC had their independence 
of judgement, a highly cries-cross security scenario 
could emerge in the region. On April 8, 1992, an US 
49 
official spokesman said, Qatar and Bahrain should 
resolve their territorial disputes between them through 
peaceful means so that one of the most serious obstacles 
before the GCC should removed. 
Although the US has signed a security pacts with 
both the mini Gulf states, Qatar and Bahrain within the 
framework of -ensuring the security of the Persian Gulf 
after the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, it 
finds itself in a very crucial and difficult position to 
the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain. Hence 
Washington found that best course was tobe strictly 
neutral and encourage both the sides to settle the issue 
through peaceful means, which was provided by the article 
of the pacts with both states. 
Before signing the defence pact with United States, 
Qatar strengthened its relations with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and concluded a series of agreements on 
cooperation in oil fields. Iran proposed some very solid 
steps to bring the two states closer, including abolition 
of visas and supply of water to Qatar through water 
pipelines, during an official visit of Deputy Foreign 
Minister Ali Mohammad Basharati. He also proposed 
collaboration in different fields in an interview with 
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the Arabic daily Al-Raya. Iran has also confirmed that 
all matter should abide by principles of territorial 
integrity and soveriegnty of Qatar. 
On 16 april 1992, Qatar strongly protested against 
Bahrain when an Amiri decree was issued by Qatar. Qatar 
defined the width of its territorial waters at 12 
nautical miles and stipulated on adjacent area of an 
other 12 miles touching from the outer limits of 
territorial sea over which Qatar shall excercise all 
rights and authorities provided in the provisions of 
International Law. The decree claimed the sovereignty of 
Qatar over all the disputed areas. To counter with 
Qatar's decree, Bahrain Foreign Ministery spokesman, on 
April 17, said that his government "totally rejects what 
the decree implied", and Bahrain has the right "to take 
any legal measures which are necessary to preserve its 
rights over its territories". The Qatari move 
pre-empted any ruling of ICJ as well as other third party 
mediation. Saudi Arabia which was making efforts to 
resolve the dispute earlier has once again revived its 
mediation to ensure a bilateal settlement of the dispute 
outside the ICJ, but so far both the states could not 
reach to any mutual agreed settlement. 
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Saudi Arabia - Qatar Dispute : 
A dormant dispute between the mini and big Persian 
Gulf state, i.e. Qatar and Saudi Arabia was erupted on 
30 September 1992 when a clash occurred on the boundary 
between armed forces of the two countries at Al-Khafous, 
far from 130 kilometers south-east of Qatarl capital 
Doha. The government of Qatar claimed that it was an 
attack of Saudi soldiers on its border post whereas Saudi 
denied the claim and subsequently said that there had 
been an exchange of fire on Saudi territory between two 
contending nomadic Saudi and Qatari tribes. In an 
official statement on the next day, however, the 
incident took place a new dimension. Qatar inter alia, 
described the clash as "a grave precedent in Qatari-Saudi 
relations". Further, the GCC member states, accused the 
Saudi government for ignoring repeated Qatari request for 
talks on the border issue and of acting unilaterally to 
demarcate the frontier, and announced that it dedcided 
"to cease acting in accordance with the border agreement 
17 
concluded between the two countries in 1965". This was 
not the first incident of its type as similar clashes had 
taken place in November 1991 but they were underplayed. 
Later on Qatar alleged on 1 October 1992, that 
Saudi armed forces expelled out its forces from border 
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posL at Al-Khafous. Thereafter the charge of Qatar on 
Saudi Arabia was dismissed by Saudi government in a 
official statement on 2 October 1992, that said "we 
deeply regret ... all the statement that have come from 
our brothers in Qatar, which we think do not serve 
people". It further added that "incidental events that 
may occur from time to time by irresponsible elements on 
both sides ..." should not affect the depth of close 
relations enjoyed by the two countries. 
Qatari Embassy in London on 14 October 1992,issued 
a statement describing the clashes between the two armed 
forces as Saudi attack on the Qatari border post of 
Al-Khafous whose objective was" to pave the way for the 
task of unilateral demarcation of boundaries ... with the 
participation of Qatari government or taking into 
consideration its legal and legitimate interests in the 
area" in violation of articles of III and V of 1965 
agreement between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
This offical statement of Qatar blamed Saudi Arabia 
for unilaterally creating sand barriers and borders marks 
in the area, in which both the states are involved in 
dispute and appealed to normalize the situation by 
withdrawing Saudi armed forces from the disputed post and 
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aiiowiiig QaLar for rGclcpIoynient of its tiilLitary troops in 
the area. 
King of Saudi Arabia, Fahd bin Abdul Aziz called a 
cabinet meeting on October 12, 1992, and emphasized 
clearly for kingdom's full adherence to all the provision 
of 1965 border agreement, between both the states, 
especially those relating to article III and V. This move 
of Saudi Arabia was welcomed in second Qatari statement 
which was issued on 14 October. 1992. There appeared a 
consensus on selecting an international survey company to 
undertake the task of demarcating the boundaries between 
the states. However, in that statement Qatar added that 
before selecting an international company it is 
necessary ... to form the joint commission and to call 
for negotiations between two countries to resolve the 
dispute within the framework of joint commission. 
Saudi Press Agency on 14 October 1992, in an 
official statement said that "the joint committee met and 
agreed upon all border posts of 1968, and the only thing 
left to agree the name of company which will carry out 
the survey process ... but the Qatari government 
hesitated in implementing the content of the joint 
minute." It further added that "the brotherly Qatar Is 
54 
during the Gulf war have crossed the border of their 
state and penetrated into the Saudi territory for at 
least 14 kilometer and establsihed a post with the name 
of Al-Khafous. The Qataris called the border post as 
Al-Khafous to misled the public opinion. But the real 
Al-Khafous lies on Qatari territory and is 14 kilometers 
away where the incident took place. It again said that 
the government of Qatar had promised more than once to 
evacuate the positions which they established inside 
Saudi territory and pretended to accept the finalization 
of the border agreement. More positive outcome, as 
suggested by an Egyptian Daily, was that the two parties 
agreed on three element of the settlement of dispute viz. 
no escalation, a return to the 1965 agreement and 
formation of a commission to demarcate the border between 
two states. 
In the mean while Saudi Arabia became very upset 
probably due to Iranian intervention in the dispute on 
behalf of Qatar which was alarming for the security of 
other member states of Gulf Cooperation Goucil. On its 
part, Iran was anxious about the impending search for a 
regional security system in the wake of the Gulf crisis 
of 1990-91 from which it was projected to be kept out but 
was very keen to play a role in Persian Gulf. In this 
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context Iran attempted to exploit the contretemps between 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar for its own necessary advantage. 
Hence President Rafsanjani's message to the Qatari ruler 
Sheikh Hamd bin Khalifa Al-Thani on October 2, 1992, 
comforting the latter that "Iran has been seriously 
against raising any issue which created division in the 
region and has done its utmost to preserve peace and 
tranquility. 
When Qatar, after the end of Gulf Warll, sent its 
Ambassador to Iraq to reopen its Embassy in Baghdad, 
Qatar's dispute with Saudi Arabia over Al-Khafous took an 
unexpected and ominous turn. Iraq however, does not 
appear to be any condition to offer more than moral 
support to Qatar. Today the Saudi-Qatar border dispute is 
threatening to go ballastic in the sense that the Gulf is at present 
living in a vaccum as far as resolving regional conflict 
is concerned. The dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
would, in normal condition hold only very limited and 
less interest for anyone not directly involved. 
Thus three important results can be drawn from the 
issue. In the first place, in the absence of external 
major power involvement a dwarf state could withstand the 
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steam rolling of a big neighbour by clever diplomatic 
measures. Secondly, Saudi Arabian position seems very 
vulnerable and Qatar's repeated plea to resort to 
International Law that evidentally hit the Sadui nerves. 
Finally Iran's involvement into Gulf, attempting to fish 
in the disputed waters promoted the contending Persian 
Gulf states to decederate their border dispute. In the 
present scenario probably Iran's interventionist role may 
stablize the power equilibrium in the Gulf region. 
Saudi Arabia - Yemen Dispute : 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen dispute over the border is 
another source of conflict between the two countries in 
the region. Apart from a small stretch, nearly 500 miles 
of border between Saudi Arabiaa and Yemen has remained 
undemarcated for so long, has been a source of potential 
conflict between the two countries. The situation became 
aggravated in recent years by the sharply different 
position taken by the two states during the* time of 
20 liberation of Kuwait. 
The border was demarcated under the Treaty of 
Muslim Friendship and Fraternity concluded between the two 
countries on May 20, 1934 at Taif. The disputed area 
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extends between 17th and 20th parallels. Before the 
emergence of Saudi Arabia as an integrated state 
(September 23, 1932 ) the lands of Arabia were the parts 
of Ottoman and British under the Anglo-Ottoman convention 
of 1914. The convention partitioned the Arabia along Blue 
and Violet Lines. The Blue lines ran from a point on the 
Persian Gulf coast opposite Zakhnuniyah Island due south 
to Rab-al-Khali to latitude 20th and then continued south 
west merging with the Violet Line towards Yemen till the 
south western tip of Aden protectorate. All territory of 
west of the Blue Line and north of the Violet Line was 
given to Turkey and all territory east and south of the 
Blue Line and south of Violet Line was awarded to 
Britain. During the Anglo-Saudi negotiation of 1934-35, 
two more lines were proposed. The first was propossed by 
Saudi Arabia and called Red/Hamza Line. The second, 
propossed by Britain, was called the Ryan/Ryadh Line. 
There was third one "Philby Line" which extended from the 
Taif Line to Al-Rayyan. Britain had control over the Aden 
Protectorate in the south-west of the Arabian Peninsula. 
Yemen have not made any negotiation in this concerned. 
The Yemenis have, in the past, been very hesitant to 
talk about the border problem with Saudis because they 
felt themselves at a disadvantage and weak as comparision 
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to Saudis, being divided into two countries. But, after 
the unification of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and 
People's Democratice Republic of Yemen (PDRY) on May 22, 
1990, the border issue with Saudi Arabia took a new shape 
and dimension. 
Therefore, in his first address to the Yemeni 
paliament, after unification of two Yemens on June 20, 
1990, premier Haider Abu Bakr Al-Alas announced his 
government's readiness to reach border settlement with 
Saudi Arabia on the bassis of "historical and legal" of 
all parties concerned. The same policy was also adopted 
by president Ali Abdullah Saleh after the end of 
21 liberation war of Kuwait, on September 17, 1991. 
So far the claim over territory is concerned, 
neither the Saudis nor Yemenis have made their position 
public. They are waiting for bilateral negotiations to 
resolve the issue before making any other proposals. The 
Saudis were initially very reluctant to respond to Yemeni 
demarche, they thought the reference to historical rights 
means Yemen. might renege on the 1934 Taif Treaty. 
However, it Is generally believed in Sana' that the 
Yemeni government recognized the 1934 Treaty de facto, 
59 
although there may be some parts of it which are not 
clear, such as the exact line to be drawn in the Red Sea 
off shores as far as Yemenis are concerned, the agreement 
22 is valid and remain in force. 
In March 1992, the dispute triggered off, when 
Yemeni government awarded oil exploration contact to six 
western oil companies. Saudi government sharply reacted 
to this event, and between March and May of 1992, the 
official of the foreign ministry sent six letters to 
those oil firms which were operating in the disputed area 
and warned them that their operations encroached on 
Saudi territory and that it reserved the right to take 
every necessary measures and methods to safeguard its 
interests. Responding to the move of Saudi Arabia the 
Yemeni Foreign Ministry sent a letter affirming 
sovereignty over the teritories and regretting Saudi 
direct coantact with these firms. Simultaneously, Yemeni 
government pledged to give support to the companies 
operations in accordance with their contacts. The Saudi 
move was interpreted as a green signal to seek 
demarcation rather than to claim territory and exacerbate 
23 the issue. 
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The Saudi letters contained no military threats to 
Yemen as denied categorically by a Saudi official on June 
6, 1992. At the same time, US administration warned both 
the countries by sending letters in April 1992 and also 
laid stress that the use of foce or the threat of force 
should be ruled out. On May 29, 1992, Riyadh issued a 
statement accusing Yemenis of refusing to negotiate a 
border settlement in the past, while calling upon them to 
restore the border markers of the 1934 Treaty to "show 
some seriousness and good intentions", and to demarcate 
remaining of the border. The Yemeni government welcomed 
the statement as far as the relations are concerned with 
24 both countries. On 8 June 1992, authoritative sources 
in the kingdom told news agency that Oman's sultan Qaboos 
would pay an official visit to Saudi Arabia on 20 June 
1992, convincing king Fahd to try to mediate the border 
issue between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. 
However, the Yemeni government responded to Saudi 
Arabian unilateral action in a very mature way by 
proposing bilateral talks to settle the border issue. 
Henceforth a Yemeni proposal to form a technical level 
committee to prepare the ground work and terms of 
reference for further discussions was accepted by both 
parties, in the first meeting which was held between 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen on July 20, 1992 in Geneva. 
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The second meeting was held in Reyadh between two 
countries on 28 September 1992. The Yemeni delegation in 
the meeting put a memorandum incorporating the proposals 
for the working procedures to be followed by the Joint 
Experts Committee which apparantly will continue the 
negotiation at different sessions to be held 
alternatively between the capitals of both the 
25 
countries. 
The Saudi side also submitted a memorandum 
containing four proposals for the definition of the 
functions of the Joint Experts Committee,which are as 
follows 2^-
i) to set up a special sub-committee with the 
task of delineating geographical points on 
the boundary as setforth in the border 
reports prepared in accordance with the terms 
of the Taif border treaty of 1934 and to 
conclude an agreement with the international 
firm for this purpose. 
ii) to demarcate the remaining parts of the 
border starting with a point at 
Jabal-al-Thar, in accordance with the terms 
of Taif Treaty, with each side submitting at 
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the same time its view of demarcation line as 
it should be delineated by the said treaty. 
iii) to demarcate the boudary in the on-shore area 
of which is not covered by the Taif Treaty 
and extends eastwards to the Oman frontiers. 
As in this case, each of the two sides will 
submit at the same time its view of boundary 
line in the area in question; and 
iv) to demarcate the off-shore boundary between 
the two countries. 
To sum up, these current territorial disputes 
between the countries of Persian Gulf are the products of 
past history they resurrected in the midst of the 
moulding of a new international and regional power 
equilibrium since last couple of years. The underlying 
reason in all cases is the urge for defined and fixed 
borders. Economic and strategic considerations too are 
the driving factor for the conflict. Unfortunately issues 
between the parties are defused rather than peacefully 
resolved. All the border disputes are open sores and have 
scant prospects of any conclusive settlement and 
disturbed the fragile peace in the region. These flash 
points would, in all probability, fade away in the 
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familiar pattern of defusion rather than solution. The 
final conclusion is based upon that the prospects of 
peace, security and stability do not seem to be assuring 
and status quo would continue to prevail in Persian Gulf 
region in the foreseeable future. 
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C H A P T E R - I I I 
IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
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The Iran-Iraq war during its entire eight years 
period showed an almost insurmountable challenge to the 
United Nations conflict resolution capability. The United 
Nations found itself in a very difficult and crucial 
position during war to maintain peace and security in the 
region. 
The war which broke out in September 22, 1980 and 
continued till August 1988, had brought death and 
suffering to hundreds of thousands of people on both 
sides, and it had devastated the economies of both 
countries. Although the war so far, had been limited to 
two belligerents, it still had the potential threat of 
spreading the fighting at any time in the rest of the rich 
Gulf region, with incalculableresults both for the states 
in the area and world at large scale. 
Origins and Causes of War: 
The rivalry between Iran and Iraq is more than three 
hundreds years old, with each trying to gain an upper hand 
2 
when the other was weak. They are traditional enemy for a 
long and they fought several times considering themselves 
as Arab and non-Arab. 
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There were several causes and factors which led Iran 
and Iraq into war that started in September 1980 as 
follows: 
1. the personal animosity between Khomeini and Saddam 
Husain, 
2. the Iran's call for the overthrow of the Sanatic 
regimes in the region, 
3. Iran's quest for power under Shah, 
4. unresolved long-standing territorial disputes, 
particularly regarding the Shatt-al-Arab. 
The bad blood between Saddam Hussein President of 
Iraq and Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Revolutionary 
leader of Iran started when Saddam Hussein, drew out 
Khomeini from his refuge in the holy city of Najaf, south 
of Baghdad, Khomeini had been taking refuge in Najaf since 
he was expelled by Shah of Iran from Iran in 1954. He was 
placed under house arrest in September 1978 because of his 
support to the anti-shah statement. Iraq government said 
that Khomeini had been causing disaffection among the 
Stiites in Iraq, who form the majority but have no place 
in the Sunni Ba 'athist leadership. 
The conflict between Iraq and Iran is all a clasa 
of diametrically opposed ideologies. The nationalist policy 
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of the Ba' ath although secular in nature supports the 
Sunni population as opposed to the mejority population and 
is aimed to attain Arab unity. The pan-Isalamic 
doctrine of the Iranian Shiites cleargy, who came to power 
in 1979, which adamently stressed the need for Islamic 
unity, rejected nationalism and called for the export of 
Isamic Revolution to the neighbouring countries, exhorting 
to rise against the satanic regimo. In 1979, 
Khomeini appealed to Iraqi people to overthrow their 
corrupt government and predicted that the Ba'ath regime 
would be thrown into the dustbin of history like the 
regime of the Shah. The then Iranian Foreign Minister also 
accused the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of being 
American agent and called for the overthrow of the Iraqi 
regime. The present ruling Ba'ath party which came to 
power in July 1968 sharply reacted to this and 
subsequently Iraq aggravated its relations with Iran. 
Apart from the vitrioloic propaganda which each country 
mounted against other, they supported the anti-regime 
elements in the rival country. The attempted coups in Iraq 
were attributed to Iranian inspiration and the activities 
of the anti-Shah elements in Iran were alleged to be 
encouraged by Iraq. While Iran supported the rebel Iraqi 
Kurds against the government of Iraq the latter supported 
the Baluchi, Communist and Arabistan (Oil-rich Iranian 
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Khu/lztnn of the south eastern border of Iraq with the 
capital Ahwaz) movements in Iran. Undoubtedly, the rivalry 
between the two countries for the leading positions in the 
Gulf area has played an important role. 
The direct seeds of the conflict germinated during 
1970s as the two states contested for controlling the 
Persian Gulf region directly after the Britain's 
withdrawal from east of Suez which lowered the western 
power profile in the Gulf. Iran seized the islands of Abu 
Musa and the two Tunbs, which had until then been under 
o 
the control of the UAE. 
Iran's seizure of Abu Musa and the Tunbs islands 
were in direct conflict with Iraqi preconceptions of its 
regional role. Iraq was quite prepared to contest this 
role with Iran. The Iranian action in 1971, therefore, 
produced an immediate Iraqi response. Baghdad protested at 
the seizure of the islands in the name of the Arab world 
and retaliated by restricting access to Iran's all 
important and world's biggest oil refinery at Abadan and 
0 
its major port Khorram Shahr."^ On the Shatt-alArab estuary 
and the loading facilities at the Kharg Island were left 
vulnerable. The west's interests were also served in 
encouraging Shah of Iran to take responsibility for 
protecting the vital sea-lanes of the Gulf. 
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The boundary dispute is a very long standing one 
among other causes of Iran-Iraq war. This craditional 
decade-long border dispute between Iran and Iraq should 
not be ignored, which is over where their border should 
run along the 195 km. long Shat-al-Arab, composed of a 
small section of the confluence of the Trigris and the 
Euphrates and serving as an outlet to the Persian Gulf for 
both countries. Iran claims that over 60 percent of the 
water flowing into the Shatt-al-Arab comes from Iranian 
rivers the Karun the Upper and Lower Zab, Dialeh and 
Kabur.^^ 
It was one of the ironies of history and a great 
source of Iranian anger that Iraq controlled the authority 
of navigation in the Shatt-al-Arab, as a result of 
decision made during the British occupation of Basra. This 
had been to ensure that the Basra authorities should 
control shipping movements in the Shatt-al-Arab and thus 
provided laraq a potentiality to use against Iran in times 
of tension. 
The Iraqi claim of sovereignty over the entire water 
way of Shatt-al-Arab essentially rests on historical 
antecedents and treaty rights. The Shatt-al-Arab had been 
under Turkish hegemomy ever since the Ottoman conquered 
Iraq in 16th Century. The 1913 Protocal of Constantipole 
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established the water boundary between Iran and Iraq 
including left (Iranian) bank of Shatt-al-Arab. The 1937, 
border treaty between two states, which conceded Iran's 
control over two anchorage areas, each about 3 miles long 
and extending to the thalweg, or the deepest part of the 
river-bed at the Iranian ports of Abadan and Khoramshahr. 
In 1969 Iran abrogated the 1937 border treaty 
unilaterally. 
In Algiers, on March 6, 1975, the Shah, of Iran and 
Saddam Hussein, the then Vice-President of Iraq's 
Revolutionary Command Council, signed an agreement which 
completely eliminated the conflict between the two 
countries. 
Shortly, after that a formal agreement was signed 
between Iran and Iraq on June 13, 1975 at Baghdad. Iraq 
agreed to have the border run along the thalweg of inter 
water part of the boundary whereas Iran accepted the 
delineation of the land portion of the border in keeping 
with Iraq's demands. Iran also agreed to withdraw its 
support to the Kurds. 
On September 17, 1980 Iraq officially denounced the 
Algiers agreement and declared the restoration of its 
sovereignty over Shatt-al-Arab. Iran sharply responded by 
closing Shatt-al-Arab and the Strait of Hormuz for passage 
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by Iraqi ships. Then on September 22, 1980 a bloody and 
brutal war was broke out between Iran and Iraq. 
The UN Response: 
Since the start of the conflict between the two 
countries, different states and international 
organizations had made number of attempts to stop the war. 
Such mediatory actions were taken several times by Olof 
Palme, acting as a special representative of the UN 
Secretary General, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement, Algeria, Japan, 
India, the Gulf Cooperation Council etc. Their proposal 
essentially was to enact an immediate ceasefire, to 
withdraw the troops of Iran and Iraq to the 
internationally recognized borders as set by the 1975 
Algiers border agreement, to station international forces 
on both sides of the border to supervise the ceasefire, to 
raise funds for financing the rehabilitation of the war 
ravaged areas of both countries, to set up a commission to 
determine the aggressor, and to begin indirect Irani-Iraqi 
negotiations right away. 
As the conflict grew in wider, the United Nations 
was best among all the international organizations, which 
played an important and very dominant role to stop the war 
between Iran and Iraq. 
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Since the war broke out between the two member 
countries, the peace initiatives started immediately by 
the United Nations. As in September 28, 1980 the Security 
Council passed the first resolution calling for an end to 
the hostilities, and this resolution was followed by 
several other resolutions viz 514, 522, 540 552, 582, 591 
all expressing pious hopes but little more. In 1985 Perez 
de Cuellar became more directly involved and adopted the 
Resolution 582 in 1986, which deplored the initial attack 
as well as called upon both countries for a ceasefire. On 
July 20, 1987 the Security Council passed the Resolution 
598 which was the final instrument and brought to an end 
11 
of the conflict between them. 
The question of I ran-Iraq war has several times been 
considered by the United Nations at various and different 
levels since it started in September 1980. The Security 
Council adopted the Resolution 470 on September 28, 1980 
urging both countries to refrain from a use of force and 
to settle the dispute between them by pacific methods in 
seeking the princip'^ of justice and international law. 
The Security Council also called upon all states to 
exercise almost res*:raint and to refrain from any act 
which might further lead to an escalation and widening of 
the conflict. Later, the United Nations decided to depute 
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its special representative the then opposition leader Olof 
Palme to mediate between Iran and Iraq to end the war. 
Till that time the efforts of the United Nations 
failed to bring about ceasefire between two countries and 
to restore peace in the Gulf region. The resolution called 
only for ceasefire and did not call for withdrawal of 
forces nor condemn Iraq for its act of aggression. The 
belligerents, however, adopted regid position although 
Iraq made some motivated concession. Iran remained firm on 
total Iraqi un-conditional withdrawal from Iranian 
12 
occupied territories. These conditions were made by the 
then Iranian President Bani Sadr. Around the same time 
Iraq made it clear that it would continue the war until, 
the border territory regained and Iran accepted its 
sovereignty over the disputed Shatt-al-Arab water way. 
The Security Council's Resolution 479, probably 
represented the Security Council's immediate concerned 
for putting a halt to and preventing further escalation of 
the conflict, and requested the belligerents to strive for 
the resolution of the differences by peaceful means. The 
question of blameworthiness for the initiation of the 
conflict was however not addressed by the resolution. On 
October 1, 1980 the President of Iran Bani-Sadr stated in 
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a message to the Secretary General, that so long as Iraq 
remained in v/iolation of Iran's territorial sovereignty, 
Iran think no use in any discussion, directly or 
indirectly, which were concerned to the conflict between 
the two states. Thus this peace attempt of United 
Nations failed to achieve the objectives, which were 
sought into the Resolution 479 (1980), to stop the war and 
to end the conflict between the two countries of Persian 
Gulf region. 
On July 12, 1982 the Security Council again 
responded to the Iran-Iraq war by adopting the Resolution 
514 at the floor of United Nations meeting. Resolution 514 
(1982) was very similar to Resolution 479 (1980) in terms 
of what it ignored and neglected i.e. an explicit 
condemnation of Iraqi act of aggression and a demand that 
Iraq restore the conditions prevailing before the outbreak 
of conflict between them. More significantly, the 
resolution was the first resolution to be adopted by the 
Security Council since Resolution 479 (1980). Iraq had 
successfully launched its first stage of aggression 
between September and November 1980, but failed in 
accomplishing its main political objective of overthrowing 
15 Khomeini from power. Countering Iraqi aggression, by 
July 1982 Iranian forces displayed potential and moved 
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into Iraqi territory for the first time since the war 
broke out in 1980. 
The Resolution 514 (1982) called for a ceasefire and 
immediate end of all military operations involved in the 
conflict between Iraq and Iran, as well as orders to both 
the countries to withdraw their military forces to 
internationally recognised boundaries. The Security 
Council, however, gone noticeably further than it had 
under Resolution 479 (1980) in deciding under paragraph 3 
of Resolution 514 (1982) "to dispatch a team of United 
Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervize the 
ceasefire and withdrawal and also requested Secretary 
General to submit a report to Security Council on the 
arrangement required for implementation of the 
1 ft 
resolution." 
Iran subsequently defied the Security Council 
Resolution 514 (1982), which sought to build bridges 
between two belligerents by taking note of the 
susceptibilities of both the parties. Iran also declared 
that it would dissociate itself from any action taken by 
the Council with regard to Iraqi war of aggression against 
Iran. Iranian foreign ministry repudiated it as "an 
organised and concerted effort of the super powers for 
checking the peoples from attaining their natural 
rights."^^ 
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While Iraq responded positively and it immediately 
informed the Secretary General of United Nations of its 
willingness to cooperate in the implementation of the 
resolution. On the other hand Iran was of the view that 
until the Security Council had come to terms with its 
obligation, it would have to bear the full 
responsibility of any consequence of its negligence to 
19 date. Iran stated its intention of dissociation "to 
cooperate with the Council in case in the future it deems 
it appropriate to take its responsibilities seriously and 
20 deal with the realities existing on the scene". 
The statement in UN peace-keeping initiatives was 
matched equally by a lack of progress on the strategic 
front by both sides. By 1983 logistical weakness on the 
Iranian side and operational weakness of the Iraqi led to 
a strategic statement with both sides confronting each 
other along a front roughly congruent with the prewar 
21 border. By mid-1983 both the countries appeared to be 
pursuing a strategy of attrition, each depending on 
intensified economic and social strains in the adversary's 
camp to produce upheaval and the collapse of the enemy 
22 
regime. In October 1983 the UN Security Council, despite 
the rejection of its peace proposals twice in the 
preceding months, asked the Secretary Gene) 
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his mediatary effors and called upon both sides to refrain 
from endangering international peace and security as well 
as jeopardizing marine life through pollution of the Gulf 
as a consequence of attacks on oil installations. Iraq 
accepted this proposal but Iran rejected and expressed its 
confidence in the UN Security General and Mr.Olof 
Palme. 
The Iran-Iraq war took a new turn with large scale 
sinking of oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz from mid 
April 1984 by Iraq. Iran sucessfully responded to the 
Iraqi aggression by attacking Iraqi oil facilities on the 
Persian Gulf and by taking support of its ally Syria to 
cut the pipeline flow of Iraqi oil through Syrian 
territory to the Mediterranean. This systematic 
interdiction of tankers carrying Iranian oil prompted Iran 
to retaliate by attacking ships calling on Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, allies of Iraq in the war. This being clear 
indication of the conflict extending to third party states 
and endangering not only regional and international peace 
9 / 
and security but also the world economy as well. 
There after this tanker war between Iran-Iraq led 
the Security Council to adopt the Resolution 552 (1984) by 
demanding to stop attacks on commercial ships en route to 
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and from the port of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. It further 
demanded that there would be no attacks on ships that are 
en route to and from states that are not parties to the 
conflict. However, despite the Resolution 552 (1984) which 
called to stop the tanker war, the air war over the 
25 Persian Gulf continued undeterred. 
Despite all the efforts the conflict displayed no 
signs of either wearing itself out or of paying any heed 
to the world opinion and concern as expressed in the 
various UN resolutions adapted by the Security Council. By 
1984, the Secretary General of United Nations sought to 
accomplish, as it was seen sending special 
representatives, fact-finding and other observer missions 
to the two countries for conciliation through mediation 
and negotiation. 
In 1983 Iraq prepared itself to sign a special peace 
treaty with Iran under UN supervision, thereby the two 
parties would undertake not to attack each other's towns 
9 ft 
and villages inspite of continuation of war. An appeal 
was made by Secretary General of United Nations to the 
belligerents to desist from attacking each other's 
27 
civilion population. 
80 
" I call, upon the Government to declare to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations that each 
undertakes a solemn commitment to end, and in the 
future refrain from initiating, deliberate military 
attacks, by aerial bombardment, missiles, shelling 
or other means, on purely civilian population 
centres. May I suggest with respect, that the holy 
month of Ramadan is a particularly appropriate time 
for both governments to undertake this humanitarian 
pledge." 
The moratorium took effect on June 12, 1984 and was 
followed on June 1, by stationing of UN military observers 
in Baghdad and Tehran to verify compliance with the 
assurances given by Iran and Iraq to observe that 
moratorium. This moratorium which was intended as an 
approach towards the peaceful solution of the conflict was 
maintained during nine months, however, it did not 
receive all necessary support from super poweis in the 
Security Council. Both super powers claimed neutrality in 
Iran-Iraq war but in fact favoured Iraq by all necessary 
28 
means• 
On March 17, 1985 the Secretary General presented 
proposals (eight point peace plan) to the two parties to 
reduce the level of conflict and to promote a cessation of 
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hostilities between the two countries. The proposal was 
the constitutional responsibility of the Secretary General 
under the Chartar framework to seek to an end of the 
29 
conflict. 
These proposals had envisaged that both the parties 
would discuss with the issue of attack on civilian 
population centres, use of chemical weapons, treatment of 
prisoners of war and safety of navigation and civil 
aviation in the framework of broader efforts made by 
Secretary General to end the war between the two states. 
The mediatory efforts of UN Secretary General Javier Perez 
de Cuellar, who visited Tehran and Baghdad between April 
7-9, 1985, to lower the scale of conflict and ultimately 
end it, came back without any success. He ^jresented a 
report on April 12, 1985 to the Security Council of his 
visit to Iran and Iraq and expressed the position of Iran 
30 in the following words: 
"In the Islamic Republic of Iran my interlocuters 
brought hor to me forcefully in some detail, their 
sense that ince the beginning of the conflict the 
actions of the Security Council had not been 
impartial £ id just. Iran resents the fact that in 
its view, the Council had failed in its duty to 
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condemn the aggressor and has not taken appropriate 
action to counter violations of international 
humanitarian law of which Iran has been victim. Iran 
feels that this perceived attitude of Council 
constitutes a serious obstacle, and believes that an 
important element in order to start any process 
towards peace would be for the Council to rectify 
its past". 
The Secretary General also mentioned that he had 
advised Iran to explain its position directly to the 
Secruity Council. He further suggested that Iran had thus 
refrained from participating in the debates and 
deliberations In the Security Council concerning the Iran-
Iraq war. To that end, the Secretary General believed that 
as a first step it was essential for the Security Council 
to extend an invitation to Baghdad and Tehran to take part 
in the examination of all the aspects of the conflict that 
the international community would marshall a new 
determined efforts to explore every avenue that might end 
31 the conflict. 
The Security Council analysed the reports 
represented by Secretary General and declared that it was 
"appalled that chemical weapons have been used against 
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Iranian solidiers during March 1985" and strongly 
condemned the "re-use of chemical weapons in the conflict 
and any possible future use of such weapons". The Security 
Council prepared its readiness "to issue at the 
appropriate movement to both parties to take part in a new 
32 
examination of all aspects of conflict". Thus the 
Council paved the way for the possible analysis of the 
issue between the belligerents to be blamed for the 
initiation of the hostilities. Iranian responded 
positively towards this move. Iran called upon Security 
Council and expressed its belief to the efforts of 
Secretary General for constituting a constructive 
framework for the further cooperation between Iran and 
United Nations towards the end of the conflict. 
On February 24, 1986 the Security Council passed the 
Resolution 582, which reflected a growing initiative on 
its part to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards Iranian 
offensive into Iraqi territory. The Iranian offensive into 
Iraq on February 25, 1986 had escalated the problem and 
alleged that Iraq again used chemical weapons against it. 
On March 21, 1986 the Security Council expressed its 
deep concern at the unanimous conclusion of the 
specialists that the chemical weapons have been used many 
times by Iraq against Iranians, most recently during the 
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present Iranian offensive into Iraqi' territory. The 
Security Council accepted Iran's request to strongly 
condemn by name for its repeated and large scale use of 
33 
chemical weapons. The Security Council on January 6, 
1987 called for the earliest termination of the protracted 
war and urged both the parties to cooperate with it with 
all endeavours to stop and end up the grave conflict. 
The seven years long conflict was taking toll on the 
capability of United Nations to control the conflict, the 
peace making machinery proved itself ineffective in the 
conflict between Iran and Iraq. All the resolutions till 
July 20, 1987, passed by Security Council displayed its 
inability and ineffectiveness in restoring and 
maintaining peace and security in the Gulf region. 
The Security Council of United Nations finally 
unanimously adopted the most important Resolution 598 
(1987) to the conflict on July 20, 1987. The resolution 
demanded that Iran and Iraq immediately cease all 
hostilities on land, sea and air at first step towards a 
negotiated settlement of the Iran-Iraq war. It also 
demanded the withdrawal of all forces to the international 
recognised boundaries without delay. The resolution 
further emphasised on the following other things:-
a) asked the Secretary General to explore, in 
consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of 
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entrusting an impartial body with enquiring into 
responsibility for the conflict. 
b) determined that there exists a breach of the peace 
as regards the conflict between Iran and Iraq and 
the Council was acting under Articles 39 and 40 of 
Chapter VII of the Charter. 
c) decided that the Council would meet again as 
necessary to consider further steps to ensure 
compliance with the resolution. 
Iraq welcomed it but the Iranian response was 
ambiguous. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Vilayati and other 
officials rejected the resolution and said it as 
worthless,un-balanced, weak and contradictory. In spite of 
his criticism Velayati pointed out that resolution had 
35 
certain positive points. 
The Soviet Union support for this western sponsored 
UN Resolution 598 (1987) was unprecedented and reflected 
the realities of new emerging relationship between United 
States and Soviet Union. After the Security Council's 
adoption of Resolution 598 (1987) a Soviet commentator 
acknowledged that the United States has no stakes in the 
continuation of the Iran-Iraq war. 
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The UN Secretary General moved to arrange a 
ceasefire as soon as he received Iran's acceptance of 
Resolution 598 (1987) but it was delayed because of Iraq's 
prolonging of the conflict again by military initiatives. 
The Iranians who for a year had held up 
implementation of Resolution 598 (1987) by seeking a 
re-odering of its clauses and demanded prior condemnation 
of Iraq as aggressor, now cast themselves in the role of 
peacemakers and defenders of the authority of the United 
Nations. 
The resolution was hailed by Council members as 
historic, evenhanded and was capable to send a clear 
signal to both the belligerents. It was pointed out that 
Articles 39 and 40 of Chapter VII were the UN Charter most 
powerful provision that the Resolution 598 (1987) was only 
the third in the history of United Nations to use all 
means envisaged in the charter and that for the first time 
ever, the Council was mandatorily decided a ceasefire and 
withdrawal of troops. On July 18, 1988 Iran announced 
its unconditional acceptance of UN Security Council 
Resolution 598 (1987). 
On August 6, 1988 Saddam Hussein declared in Baghdad 
that Iraq is ready to ceasefire on condition that Iran 
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agrees and is willing to hold direct talks to implement UN 
Security Council Resolution 598 (1987) immediately after 
the ceasefire. Therefore, on August 20, 1988 a formel 
ceasefire v\7as secured in the eight years long Iran-Iraq 
war in the context of the full implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 598 (1987) under supervision of a 
specially created 350 members monitoring force-the UN 
Iran-Iraq military observer group and peace negotiations 
began in Geneva on August 25y 1988 at foreign ministerial 
level. 
Invariably in course of war between Iran and Iraq, 
United Nations presented various resolutions, proposals, 
reports, despatches of investigatory missions althour^h may 
not have succeeded in its mission but still represent 
significant and important contribution to stop the 
conflict and to restore and maintain peace and security in 
the region. The efforts made by United Nation failed in 
certain cases due to intrenched positions adopted by 
parties to the dispute. UN efforts to resolve the dispute 
have been obstructed by the actions taken by super powers 
and domination of super powers over the UN who used it for 
their own objectives and interests. 
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C H A P T E R - I V 
THE GULF CRISIS 1990-91 AND THE UN RESPONSE 
The Gulf crisis, which took place on August 2, 1990, 
is an unforgetable tragedy in the history of Persian Gulf 
as well as for whole West Asia. It has posed very serious 
threat and challenge to international peace and security 
as well as authority of the United Nations. 
In a sudden and shift move, Iraq invaded and 
occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990, not only stunned the 
entire world community, but also created a commotion all 
around the Persian Gulf. The annexation of Kuwait en^Tulfed 
the whole of West Asia into a grave and perilous crisis. 
The crisis though clearly emerged as blue and unimaginably 
but the evidences and the glittering facts revealed the 
explicit reasons that led Saddam Hussein to do this wrong 
act against a neighbouring and sizeable tini and weak Gulf 
state which had been continuously supporting Iraq with 
huge finances during its eight years long devastative war 
with Iran. 
Origins and Causes of Crisis: 
Historically, both Iraq and Kuwait were the part of 
the Ottoman Empire, which collapsed at the time of first 
92 
world war. Inside the Ottoman Empire the Sultan appointed 
the sheikh of Kuwait as the representative of the 
Governor of Basra which at present is a city of Iraq. On 
this basis, Iraq has long made the claim over Kuwait as 
part of the province of Basra which means part of Iraq. 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1917 
Britain formally held Kuwait as its protectorate. The 
Emirate of Kuwait was created by the British to protect and 
safeguard their economic interests which dovetailed into 
2 
the interests of the Al-Sabah dynasty. The first 
acknowledged sheikh and founder of Al-Sabah dynasty of 
3 
Kuwait was Sabah Abdullah (Sabah I) of Umm Qasr. Hence 
the state Kuwait is an artificial creation of Britain 
which was created to fulfill its imperial and economic 
domination over the region after the downfall of Ottoman 
Empire. 
With the end of world war I and collapse of 
Ottomans, the colonial powers, particularly Britain was 
very much anxious to hold its imperial control over the 
region, and the former Ottoman Empire was divided into 
small states with artificially imposed boundaries. The 
foreign powers turned the Arab world into a chess board 
where they contested for political and strategic control 
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and moved the pawns for domination. The Gulf crisis was 
the culmination of the process of division and evolution 
of new state system in the Arab world. It exposed the 
grand design of the big powers to continue to maintain the 
spheres of influence for their own political,economic and 
strategic interests in the region with much 
significance. 
It was in this background that Britain and the 
Ottoman authorities concluded an agreement on July 19, 
1913 which recognized the autonomy of the sheikh of Kuwait 
but it could not be ratified due to the outbreak of world 
war I in 1914. This constituted the first official act of 
renunciation on the part of Ottoman government of full 
sovereignty over the sheikhdom of Kuwait and the official 
admission of the special British status there. The 
demarcation of boundary between Kuwait and Iraq was later 
reaffirmed by the Iraqi Premier General Nuri Pasha and the 
British Political Resident in 1932. They also confirmed 8 
offshore islands belonging to Kuwait. They included Warba, 
Bybyan, Failakha, Auha, Kubbar, Quru, Muqta and Umm al 
Maradin, and other adjacent islands. 
Iraq came into existence by the treaty of San Remo 
signed in 1920 consisting of three Ottoman provinces 
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namely Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, but remained under 
British control until its half independence was achieved 
in 1932. And Kuwait, for example, oftenly used to be part 
of Iraqi province of Basra by Iraqi regime, during Ottoman 
Empire and Iraq has always disputed Kuwait's status as a 
separate nation from its existence. In 1922 Sir Percy 
Z. Cox, the British High Commissioner in Iraq decided to 
cut Kuwait from Iraq and kept it under the British 
control. This change was strongly opposed by the Iraqi 
monarch. King Ghazi (1935-1939).^ 
June 19, 1961 was the turning point in the history 
of Kuwait when the treaty of 1899 was abrogated and 
replaced by another treaty of friendship with an 
independent state of Kuwait. There after it was admitted 
o 
to League of Arab States and United Nations. In that very 
year of Kuwait's independence the ruler of Iraq, General 
Qasim declared that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq 
and so he amassed his army on the border of Kuwait and 
appealed to the Arab countires and the world community to 
Q 
acknowledge Iraq's right over Kuwait. He reiterated the 
laraqi claim and tried to capture Kuwait. The Kuwait 
government appealed to the British government for help and 
entered into a military arrangement with the latter. On 
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July 1, 1961, the British troops landed in Kuwait. Thus, 
Iraqi attempt was neutralized by the Arab forces and 
British forces in the first major Iraqi-Kuwait crisis. 
The issue was settled down in October 1963 in wake 
of a change of regime in Baghdad when General Abdul Qasim 
was overthrowned through a military coup d'etat led by 
General Abdul Salam Arif who later recognized the 
independence and sovereignty of Kuwait and established 
diplomatic relations. But the boundary and territorial 
problem remained unsettled between two countries. Time and 
again, Iraq claimed sovereignty over Kuwait. In 1978 Iraqi 
forces crossed the frontier and seized a Kuwaiti border 
post of al-Samata. 
Over the years a number of meeting between Iraq and 
Kuwait took place to settle the border problem, but no 
agreement could be reached in this connection. Thus, 
Saddam Hussein's August 2, 1990 invasion was nothing but a 
new ring added to the chain that the former Iraqi leaders 
10 
anxiously wanted to ococupy Kuwait with. 
The origin of the Gulf war clearly discloses the 
Iraq's ill intention for which Iraqi regime had already 
founded the base in order to fulfill its ambition. The 
intention appeared explicitly after a memorandum was sent 
by the Iraqi government to the Arab League in which it 
focussed and drew attention of Kuwait and its strategic 
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area. The memorandum states that Iraq believes that the Arabs wherever they 
may be, are one nation and that its wealth should be 
distributed for the benefit of everyone and if anyone 
should suffer harm or grief then everyone suffers. Iraq 
looks at the wealth of the nation on the basis of these 
principles, and it had acted in accordance with these 
principles. In this memorandum Iraq alleged Kuwait that it 
violated the territorial laws and adopted a policy aimed 
to harm Iraq in a continuous and preplanned way. 
The invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq was 
not an isolated event. It had its causes rooted in the 
past and the current developments as well. At domestic 
level, there was big contributory factor latent in 
economy and polity of Iraq. Saddam Hussein was confronting 
with a difficult and serious situation at home after the 
protracted and inconclusive war with the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. He was struggling to overcome a very critical 
economic situation. The Iraqi people were very 
disillusioned with the assumed victory of Iraq over Iran. 
They thought that the long and costly war with Iran did 
not yield any gain for their country. Saddam Hussein 
desperately need to divert the attention of the 
disgruntled Iraqi to prove that Iraq under his leadership 
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could still regain its lost glory. The Iraq that emerged 
from the war with Iran saw itself as having triumphed 
against the great traditional foe of the Arab world. For 
the Iraqi authorities, therefore, massive debts that Iraq 
had acquired during the war with Iran was probably $ 70-80 
billion.-^^ Out of $ 70-80 billion total debt Iraq owed 44 
billion dollars from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
On July 16, 1990, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz 
delivered a letter to the Arab League Secretariat in 
Tunis, in which he accused Kuwait of deliberately 
engineering a lower price for oil in order to damage the 
Iraqi economy. 
Next day on 17 July 1990 Saddam Hussein accused 
Kuwait for exceeding the oil production quota set by the 
Organisation of Petrolium Exporting Countries (OPEC), thus 
forcing down the prices. He said that $ 1 off the oil 
price per barrel cost Iraq $ 1 billion lost a year. The 
collapse of the oil price in June to $ 14 a barrel as a 
result of over production by Kuwait and United Arab 
Emirates presented Iraq with a critical financial 
crices. 
Furthermore, Iraq blamed Kuwait for having stolen 
oil worth $ 2.4 billion from its Rumaila oilfield lies in 
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the Iraqi territory during war with Iran. Iraq demanded 
compensation for the theft of Iraqi oil and also demanded 
the cancellation of Iraqi's huge loan from Kuwait 
totalling $ 12 billion taken during eight years war with 
Iran. But the demand was rejected by Kuwait. 
Besides, Iraq has long been interested in getting 
two islands of Bubiyan and Warba, which are in possession 
of Kuwait. These islands, lie at the head of the Persian 
Gulf and could provide Iraq an access to the Gulf and the 
15 Indian Ocean. 
Kuwait has one fifth of the world's known oil 
reserve. So if Iraq could have continued control over 
Kuwait it means Iraq could have been in direct control of 
1 fi 
upto twenty percent of the world's oil Production. 
Above all Iraq had put forward some demands to be 
fulfilled by Kuwait. The demands were as: 
i) To raie prices to the level of $ 25/b. It was later 
granted partially by setting the prices at $ 21/b in 
the OPEC's meeting, held two days before the crisis. 
ii) To write off the interest free loan which Kuwait had 
granted to Iraq during its eight years war with 
Iran. This demand was outrightly turned down by 
Kuwait. 
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ill) The final demand was to pay $ 2.4 billion for having 
stolen oil from Rumaila oil field. It was on much 
insistence and pressure partially granted by Kuwait 
1 7 
to pay $ 1 billion. 
The Kuwaiti government sharply reacted on the 
allegations made by Iraq and blamed that it was a 
falsification of the facts and the reverse of the truth, 
since Iraq has long record of encroachment on Kuwaiti 
territory. 
On July 25, 1990 US ambassador, April Glaspie in a 
meeting said to SaddamHussein that the US took no official 
position of Iraq's border with Kuwait, and that the US had 
1 8 
no opinion on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti boarder conflict. 
So, President Saddam Hussein drew optimistic 
conclusions from the statement of US ambassader's 
carefully remarks. He seemed to have felt encouraged that 
the US would not take any action against him if he 
attacked on Kuwait. 
In short these were the explicit and implicit causes 
which led of the onset of the Gulf crisis of August 2, 
1990, when Kuwait was annexed and occupied by Iraq. 
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The UN Response: 
The chain of unusual events in the Gulf vaulted the 
UN to a political position for the first time in its A5 
years of history. The UN response to the crisis through a 
multi-lateral action under its centralized direction 
created a historical watershed as far as its 
responsibility of maintaining international peace and 
security is concerned. The UN Charter provides different 
mothods for settling international disputes namely, 
19 diplomatic, judicial and coercive. The Charter 
explicitly mentions in ArticleIthat the purposes of United 
Nations are, enteralia to maintain peace and security and 
to that end: take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means and in 
conformity with the principles of justice and 
international judgement or settlement of international 
disputes or situations which might lead to breach of the 
20 
peace. The Security Council also empowered to determine 
the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or 
21 
an act of aggression and take such action by air, sea, 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
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22 international peace and security. The charter of UN also 
provides for all member of UN in order to contribute to 
the maintenance of peace and security, undertake to make 
available to the Security Council, on its call and in 
accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed 
forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of 
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining 
. ^ ^. 1 23 international peace. 
Thus UN Charter provides for both peaceful 
settlemtnt of a dispute when referred to the UN under 
Chapter VI, as well as active intervention under chapter 
VII of United Nations's Charter. 
The Iraqi invasion on August 2, 1990 and its 
occupation of Kuwait represented a most blatant challenge 
to the body of rules governing inter-state behaviour, as 
laid down in the United Nations. This is not to say that 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq is the first and only country 
to have committed a gross violation of UN charter 
principles. Indeed, Korea (1950-53), Hungary (1956) Suez 
(1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) Afghanistan (1979-89), 
Panama (1989) and many others bear glaring testimony of 
such violations of UN Charter. 
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Immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 
United Stated called for an emergency meeting of the Security 
Council under chapter VI, Article 35 (1) which provided 
that any member of the UN may bring any dispute, or any 
situation of the nature referred to in the Article 34, to 
the attention of the Security Council or General Assembly. 
In the meeting it was decided that the invasion as an 
unwarranted invasion by a sisterly country (Iraq) against 
a peace living country (Kuwait). The representative to the 
UN stated that if the Security Council could not enforce 
Iraqi withdrawal, "no country will be safe and the 
security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every 
"24 
state will be jeopardized, whereas Iraq attempted to 
justify the invasion on the invitation of the Provisional 
Free Government of Kuwait that was staging a coup d'etat 
in Kuwait. Iraq, then declared Kuwait as 19th province of 
Iraq claiming that the branch has returned to its 
25 
origin. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces was 
considered as wrong, brutal and illegal move, as occupying 
and annexing a country by use of force is not an option 
open to any country in the community of nations. 
There was an unprecedented response to this event 
within as well as outside the United Nations. The day 
Auo'Jst 2, 1990, the event took place, Security Council 
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passed the Resolution 660 under the terms of Article 39 
and 40 of Chapter VII of UN Charter, in which it condemned 
the Iraq's invasion and demanded the complete, immediate 
7 ft 
and unconditional withdrawal. It also called on Iraq and 
Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the 
resolution if they have any differences over it. The 
Resolution 660 was passed by 14 members of the Security 
Council, Yemen, the only Arab country on the Security 
Council as a non-permanent member, did not take any 
position. It is very interesting to note that it was for 
the first time, the United States and Soviet Union were in 
political consonance at the United Nations Security 
Council resolution despite Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of 
Friendship concluded in 1972. 
This was not the first time that the provision of 
Chapter VII of the Charter were cited as the basis of 
resolution. At least on two occasions in the past, in 1948 
in order to resolve the conflict in Palestine, and in 1987 
to call for an end the Iran-Iraq war, the Security Council 
had acted under these powers. In this connection. Article 
25, Chapter V, provides that resolutions are binding on 
member states and their violation will result in 
imposition of sanctions. Iraq promptly rejected the 
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Resolution 660 and called it inequitous and unjust, taken 
without allowing itself sufficient time to comprehend the 
situation and to acquaint itself with the facts from the 
27 parties concerned. On the contrary, Kuwait, which 
welcomed the resolution, accused Iraq of plundering and 
looting its resources and called upon Security Council to 
ensure the wishes of international community by imposition 
of sanctions against Iraq for its refusal to withdraw from 
Kuwait. 
Indeed, the United States, the European community, 
Japan, Canada and the Soviet Union had already announced 
measured like freezing assets, ban on oil supplies, 
stoppage of export of arms etc., to widen out the net and 
seek collective endorsement of those unilateral measures. 
As a result the Iraqi representative vainly warned the 
Security Council that any move for economic sanctions, 
instead of helping resolution of the crisis, would 
excerbate it and might create a heavy, negative impact on 
28 
the economies of the developing countries. 
Therefore, on August 6, 1990, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 661. Acting under Chapter VII Article 
41 of the UN Charter it decided to take measure for 
29 imposing economic sanctions against Iraq. The Security 
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Council ordered a trade and financial embargo of Iraq and 
occupied Kuwaiit, covering world-wide oil embargo, 
sanctions banning economic and financial dealings with 
them . However, the trade embargo was soon turned into a 
maritime and air embargo by the United States against 
Iraq. The US President Bush announced an order for a naval 
blockade of Iraq as a part of the economic embargo, which 
was described later, by the UN Secretary General, Javier 
30 Perez DeCuellar as "a breach of the UN Charter". In this 
connection, any blockade has to have UN Security Council 
approved under Article 41 of the UN Charter. Ihe 
Resolution 661 allowed supply of food stuffs and medical 
goods under humanitarian circumstances. The Security 
Council Resolutiion 661 envisaged a broad setup of 
sanctions enveloping all aspects of economic, financial 
and military relations to oversee the progress of 
31 implementation of these sanctions. This resolution had 
been passed by 13-0-2 with the abstention of Cuba and 
Yemen from Security Council. 
Despite, severely criticising the Security Council 
resolution, Iraq formally annexed Kuwait on August 8, 
1990 and claimed that it was a part of Iraq in the past. 
The Resolution 6")? was therefore unanimously adopted by 
Security Council on August 9, 1990. As per this Security 
Council's resolution the annexation of Kuwait was 
declared " null and viod". 
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Iraq held all the foreign nationals residing in 
Iraq and Kuwait into custody and confined them in 
strategic places thinking to be used as human shields. 
Again this action of Iraq unanimously led the Security 
Council to pass Resolution 664 on August 18, 1990. The 
resolution warned Iraq and demanded that Iraq should 
release all the foreign nationals under its custody in 
33 Iraq and in the occupied Kuwait. Iraq accepted the 
resolution on some conditions but US and its allies had 
not agreed to those conditions which were placed by Saddam 
Hussein, and then nothing came out of this resolution and 
situation was still dangerous for both of them. 
Sooijafter Resolution 665 was passed by Security 
Council, on August 25, 1990, in 13-0 with Cuba and Yemen 
abstaining and authorised that the measures as may be 
necessary including use of force to enforce the trade 
34 
embargo against Iraq by member nations. China did not 
agreed to the use of force in the name of United Nations. 
US was favouring these sanctions which were imposed 
against Iraq. Iraq pointed out that any use of force 
against a country could only be under Article 42 and other 
subsequent Articles, under the authority of the Security 
Council in cooperation with the Military Staff Committee. 
For the first time in 50 years, Japan joined the Soviet 
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Union in calling on Iraq to release all the foreign 
hostages and vacate Kuwait if Iraq did not agree to permit 
food shipment to go directly, providing food and medicines 
to foreign nationals trapped in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. 
This situation led the Security Council to adopt another 
Resolution 666, on September 13, 1990. The resolution 
drawn up on the parameters for the delivery of food stuffs 
to Iraq and occupied Kuwait for Asian workers resident in 
35 these two countries. The resolution was passed with 
vote of 13-2-0, while Cuba and Yemen vot^d against it. The 
member of United Nations agreed that it was unfortunate 
that civilian population was suffering and blamed Iraq for 
causing suffering to civilian by its refusal to withdraw 
from Kuwait. 
When the Iraqi troops entered into the residence of 
Ambassador of France, the UN Secretary Council unanimously 
adapted Resolution 667 on September 17, 1990 and condemned 
Iraq for the violation of the diplomatic premises and 
37 personnel in Kuwait. The resolution made a strong demand 
for immediate release of all foreign nationals. Iraqi 
National Assembly condemned Resolution 667 and called that 
it is based on false information and the Security Council 
has not, in the first place, tried to make sure 
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the facts.-"^ On September 20, 1990, Saddam Hussein 
warned that It would launch an all-out war against 
coalition forces, if it is covinced that the UN trade 
embargo was about to strangle the Iraqi people. Then the 
Security Council passed another Resolution 669 on 
September 24, 1990 in a meeting, defining the role of the 
Sanction Committee. The Resolution 669 calls that the 
Sanctions Committee is empowered to permit food, medicines 
or other humanitarian aid to be sent into Iraq or 
39 Kuwait. 
Despite above all these endevours, Saddam Hussein 
continuously emphasised that Kuwait was a part of Iraq and 
said that "we will not give it up even if we have to fight 
for thousand years." Thereafter, Security Council adopted 
Resolution 670, by vote of 14-1, which confirmed that 
sanctions would apply to all means of transport, including 
all air corgo traffic, except UN authorised humanitarian 
aid against Iraq and occupied Kuwait. The UN memberstates 
are directed to detain Iraqi shipping that may attempt to 
break the embargo, for the effective implementation of the 
resolution. All the member states voted in favour of the 
resolution while Cuba voted against it. 
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The Resolution 674 which was passed on October 29, 
1990 by Security Council held Iraq liable for the v>7ar 
dameges, relating to invasion of Kuwait, including human 
rights violations. It also demanded that all western 
embassies be restocked with food, waters and protection of 
Kuwaitis and foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, it 
41 further demanded an immediate release of all hostages. 
The voting in the Security Council was 13-0 with Cuba and 
Yemen abstaing. 
While ignoring all the resolution by Iraq, the 
Security Council passed the Resolution 677, on November 
28, 1990 which directed Secretary General to take 
possession of Kuwaiti census and citizinship records for 
P I . 4 2 safe keeping. 
Thus all these resolutions passed by UN Security 
Council and sanctions imposed on by UN could not achieve 
any effective and desired end. Then the most important and 
controversial Resolution 678 was passed by UN Security 
Council under the Chapter VII authorizing the use of force 
to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait as an ultimate action. This 
resolution was passed with the voting 12-2-1 in which 
China, a permanent member, abstained and Cuba and Yemen 
were voted against it. The resolution under Chapter VII of 
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the Charter of UN Paragraph 1 demanded for Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait as stated earlier in Security 
Council resolutions. Paragraph 2 of the resolution, 
authorised member states to cooperate with the government 
of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before January 15, 1991, 
fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above the 
foregoing resolution "to use all necessary means" to 
uphold and implement security Council Resolution 660 
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to 
restore international peace and security in the area. 
Paragraphs, requests all states to provide appropriate 
support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of 
paragraph 2 of 678 (1990) resolution.^-^ 
The words "use of force" does not obviously contain 
in the paragraph. The "use (of) all necessary means" in 
Resolution 678 (1990) has been interpreted by US and its 
alies as an authorization to use armed force against Iraq 
in order to compel it to withdraw from Kuwait and liberate 
all foreign detainees. This interpretation is, however 
against the established terms of interpretation. The 
Security Council could have use the term armed forces, if 
it intented so. Nevertheless, there can be any doubt that 
the words "all necessary means" denoted the use of force. 
The absence of these words in context of the charter of 
the UN and earlier resolutions of the Security Council 
I l l 
means that it has in fact sanctioned use of all measures 
other than armed forces. The wordings of the Resolution 
678 were not so disticnt that it was very difficult to 
determine whether the action against Iraq to be taken v>7as 
to be under Chapter VII of the UN or not. The military 
action was to be directed by Security Council under 
Articles 46 and 47 by creating a Military Staff. In this 
connaction the resolution just appeared as an excuse to 
give authority and legitimacy to any military action taken 
by members against Iraq on the pretext of assisting and 
giving help to Iraq. So, the nature of the wording of 
the resolution was vague and unclear under the chapter VII of 
UN Charter. 
Iraq immediately reacted to both the Resolution 678 
(1990) and deadline of January 15th 1991 and said that "it 
is illegal and invalid." The Iraqi newspaper Al-Thawarh 
said the resolution is a blatant violation of all 
humanity, peace and legality and accused the Security 
Council members of having sccumbed to pressures, threats 
and monetary aid to the tune of millions of dollers to 
46 
comply with it. The Resolution 678 was a landmark 
decision which may be used as a precedent to deal with 
future cases of aggression. 
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The Security Council adopted the resolution under 
VII of the UN charter which lays down the complete 
procedure in Articles 42 to 49 for the use of armed forces 
to restore and maintain international peace and security. 
The charter of the UN permits the use of armed force by 
one member state against another. But the entire Charter 
prohibits the use of force. It is only the Security 
Council which is authorised to use of armed force against 
a member of the UN. It is also mentioned in the Chapter 
VII that all forces of the UN must be operated under the 
UN flag. 
However condition were not mentioned in Resolution 
678 (1990) nor these were carried out in the Gulf Crisis. 
The coalition forces did not fight under UN flag, thus it 
could not legitimately be called a UN war. In the Gulf 
war all UN sanctions were the blatant violation of human 
rights and humanitarian laws and it brought the world on 
the edge of an invironmental disaster. It made a dangerous 
atmosphere for the survival of mankind and UN Charter 
prohibits any threat to the survival of mankind. Hence the 
legitimacy and legality of Resolution 678 has been 
48 questioned on certain grounds: 
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1) It was In contravention with the spirit of the UN 
Charter which promises to eliminate the scourge of 
war. 
2) The Resolution 678 made no mention on how long the 
application of"all necessary means" can continue and 
the type of amount of armed forces was to be used. 
3) The resolution ignored the provisions mentioned in 
Chapter VII of the charter which specifically 
empower the Security Council (not any member state 
of the UN) to involve in use of force and to conduct 
the operations under the Military Staff Committee 
and under the UN flag. 
4) It was also in contravention of Article 27 (3) which 
says that an important resolution of the Security 
Council must have the concurrence of the five 
permanent members. Though China had abstained from 
Security Council, it implied that it did not concur 
and as such meant that the Resolution 678 was not 
perfect and its action was not legitimate. 
5) It is pointed out that Resolution 678 was an 
imperfect legal form vis -a-vis the charter. The VII 
of the Charter includes, besides the provision of 
collective measures by the UN (Articles 41 to 42) 
provision of self defence (Article 51). 
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But the use of armed forces against Iraq was called 
enforcement action and not collective self defence. For 
instance, the application of force will not be confined to 
defend or liberate Kuwait, but it would also include all 
measures to restore internationalpeace and security in the 
region. Thus the analysis of Resolution 678 vis-a-vis the 
UN Charter revealed a vagueness in the framework of the 
charter which exposed It to conflicting cntcrprctatlons. 
The Iraqi refusal to comply with the Security 
Council resolutions by 15 January, led the coalition 
countries to promptly availed the authority of Security 
Council under Resolution 678 (1990) to attack on Iraq on 
January 16, 1991 to evict Iraq from Kuwait. Thereafter the 
biggest and most powerful air attack in history was 
launched on January 17, 1991 on Iraq by US-led coalition 
forces. The Gulf war was coded as Operation Desert 
49 Storm. But, Persian Gulf war was not the UN war against 
Iraq, as it was observed by the then Secreatry General 
Perez De Cuellar. The Secretary General said that the war 
in Gulf is not UN war and the world body has no control 
over it... We are informed through Security Council about 
military operation but after it had taken place. The 
coalition force did not fight under UN flag and the 
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direcLioiis of SecurlLy Council. In fnct, the wnr fonpht 
against Iraq, was the actually US action. Moreover it was 
obviously clear from the war that the Security Council had 
very little control over the war authorized by it. 
During the war President Bush said that the 
objective of war was very clear. He further said that we 
want that Saddam's troops will leave Kuwait and the 
legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to it 
rightful place and Kuwait will be independent and free. He 
added that the US and its coalition forces had operated 
under the UN resolution. 
Cuba on the other hand, reacting on Security Council 
resolution, demanded an immediate ceasefire in the Gulf 
war. The Cuban Ambassador thus commented that "the Council 
members are obliged to do something to put an end to the 
war." He further added that "the role of UN was to promote 
peace and international security and not to authorize 
52 
war." But as the war progressed and continued it was 
clear that the UN had no control over it, nor over the 
military operation against Iraq. The US was very much 
determined to knock out Iraqi military capability. Thus 
the US real and clear aim was the complete destruction of 
Iraq and to overthrow of Saddam's regime. 
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While the Gulf war was started against Iraq, Kuwait 
informed Security Council that it was exercising its right 
to self defence and to restoration of its right and 
cooperating with the forces of fraternal and freindly 
states which were equally determined to end Iraqi illegal 
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and illegitimate occupation over it. 
As the war progressed and continued with ups and 
down up to March 2, 1991, the Security Council held 
several informal consultations among the member states. 
Therefore, throughout the period of war, the Secutity 
Council did not discuss formally the situation except in a 
few close door meetings. 
The Gulf War continued till March 2, 1991 when the 
Resolution 686 was passed by the Security Council. In the 
mid night of February 28, coalition forces were ordered to 
stop offensive operation by United States. Thus, military 
operation were suspended against Iraq and temporary 
ceasefire was declared and war was ended with destruction 
of Iraq and victory of coalition forces. After all Kuwait 
was liberated and was given to its previous 
government.Iraq declared that it would comply fully with 
all Security Council resolutions and announced that its 
all troops evacuated Kuwait. 
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On March 2, 1991 an emergent meeting was convened to 
consider the US drafted resolution at the forum of United 
Nations. Then the Security Council adopted Resolution 686, 
setting the terms for ceasefire. It was passed by 11-1-3 
votes. Cuba voted against the resolution while China, 
Yemen and India were chosen abstention. The resolution 
did not talk about ceasefire, but laid down pre-conditions 
namely Iraq's requirements to annul Kuwait annexation to 
accept liability for financial losses etc. It neither 
declared formal ceasefire not did it order coalition 
forces out of Kuwait or lift sanctions against Iraq. It 
also could not provide even time-table for the withdrawal 
of external forces from Iraq. The resolution authorized 
the US - led coalition forces to use all necessary means 
to ensure Iraqi compliance with the UN resolutions and 
terms of the formal ceasefire. This was inadequate because 
it did not mention that the Security Council should play 
an important role in monitoring and arranging peace and 
ceasefire in the region. Instead, it authorized the use of 
force again to bring about formal ceasefire. On March 3, 
1991 laraq agreed to fulfil its obligations under the 
terms of Resolution 686, by sending letters to Security 
Council President and the Secretary General. On March 
22nd, Sanction Committee decided to lift the embargo on 
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civilian and humanitarian imports, and on March 24th, UN 
announced to lift the ban on supply of food and fuel to 
Iraq. 
The Security Council adopted another Resolution 687 
(1991), on April 3, 1991 by which the Gulf war would 
formally come to an end. The resolution was drafted very 
carefully in a document containing 36 paragraphs. It was 
sponsored by Belgium, France, Romania, UK, US and Zair. 
The vote was 12-1-2. Cuba voted against and Ecuador and 
Yemen were abstained in this resolution. The resolution 
has nine sections which set out specific conditions 
thereby international peace and security would be restored 
in the Persian Gulf region. These nine parts of the 
58 
resolution are as follows! 
PART-A. asked Iraq and Kuwait to respect the 
inviolability of the 1963 international boundary 
and called upon the Secretary General to help 
demarcate that boundary. 
PART-B. req''3sted a UN observer unit to monitor a 
demilitarized zone established under the 
resolution. 
PART-C. asked Iraq to unconditionally accept the 
destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its 
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chemical, biological weapons and ballistic missiles 
of more than 150 km. range. Iraq was also required 
to submit locations, number and types of such 
weapons. There would be a UN team to inspect the 
sites of all chemical, biological and missile 
capacities. It would also supervise their 
destruction. International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) would inspect Iraq's nuclear capabilities 
and would submit a plan for their destructions or 
removal. 
PART-D. asked the Secretary General the return of all 
Kuwait's properties by Iraq. 
PART-E reaffirming Iraq's liability under international 
law for any direct loss, damage or injury for 
foreign government, nationals and corporations, as a 
result of its occupation of Kuwait. Mechanism to be 
adopted for this was specified. 
PART-F. stated that all prohibitions against sale or 
supply of food and other necessities for civilians 
were to be lifted and that other bans would be 
lifted methodically. 
PART-G. called upon Iraq to extend all necessary 
cooperation to the international committee of the 
Red Cross to facilitate the repatriation of all 
Kuwaiti and third country nationals. 
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PART-H. called upon Iraq to inform the Security Council 
that it would not commit/support any act of 
international terrorism. 
PART-I. declared that a formal ceasefire between Iraq, 
Kuwait and coalition countries would come into 
effect, when Iraq accepted Resolution 687. 
Iraq sharply reacted to the resolution as it was 
expected. The Iraqi ambassador to the UN said these 
conditions imposed upon Iraq, is very dangerous and would 
jeopardize its sovereighty and independence and also would 
paralyse its economy. 
However, despite severe criticism and protest to the 
resolution, Iraq annouced to accept the ceasefire 
resolution on April 6, 1991. The UN ceasefire resolution 
on the subject of Iraq confirmed the international 
ascendancy of United States. 
The US seemed to have exploited the Council and UN 
Charter as a tool to serve its national interest abroad. 
The United Nations was used as a tool for its foreign 
policy goals and the UN was an instrument in American 
hands. It is very clear that UN had no control over the 
course of military operation in Gulf war. It was USA which 
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actually had control over whole military operation during 
war. As President Bush said that "we are going to make 
such an example for Saddam Hussein that no one else will 
ever dare again." At the UN, the US was confident of its 
ability to influence all the states. With the break up of 
the Soviet Union as an effective deterrent power to the US 
the latter emerged as supreme international actor In new 
International order. During the Gul£ crisis the Security 
Council functioned under the US' s will. Not even a single 
veto was cast by any permanent member to avoid incurring 
US ill will. In other words the Security Council 
functioned as an effective instrument of US foreign policy 
59 during Gulf crisis. 
The whole world was clamoring against the shameful 
role of UN in the Gulf Crisis. It was deaf and dumb, limp 
and life less- a rubber stamp in the hands of the major 
powers of the world. The military operation against Iraq 
was not UN war but a war by coalition of about 27 states. 
There was no difference between UN resolutions and US 
initiatives. It is for the first time an individual state 
had been authorized to take military action against other 
state under the umbrella of UN. The US was a singular 
importance in this war as the sole surviving super power 
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with the military superiority to conduct such a military 
operation even with little or no support of its allies. 
UN on its own is an inadequate and ineffective 
institution to handle and resolve the dispute among the 
states. It is also true that the UN was made a scapegoat 
in the Gulf crisis. UN had to take the blame for unlawful 
acts, omissions and commissions of its member states. 
Hence, UN did not work as peace maker in Gulf crisis. 
In short, one can conclude that the role of United 
Nations during the Gulf crisis was ineffective and 
inadequate because it had not functioned according to its 
framework (UN Charter). The entire performance, in the 
Gulf crisis, the United Nations was the role of United 
States. Thus, the role of United Nationsin the Gulf crisis 
was extremely formal but the actual and real role was 
played by the United states. 
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CHAPTER - V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Persian Gulf region has acquired strategic, 
economic and political importance in world politics 
particularly to super powers since world war II. In view of 
its significance, the Persian Gulf has been a cause of 
super power rivalry in the region. 
The region was the hotbed of colonial rivalry among 
European maritime powers in the 16th century until the 
end of the second world war. The region assumes this 
geo-strategic significance primarily because of its 
enormous oil wealth and its profound impact on the 
economies of the industrialized and developed world. Oil 
has been the most important commodity that makes the 
vulnerability of the region to the west since its discovery 
in 1909. The discovery of oil and its increasing production 
and demand has caused the transformation of the Gulf 
region. Thus the oil has been the only and single factor 
that gave the greater significance of Persian Gulf region 
into major power politics in general and super power 
politics in particular. 
Till the second world war, the Gulf politics was 
dominated by maritime powers. Britishers were the powerful 
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and paramount power among the other colonial powers in 
the region. The superiority and domination lasted until 
the withdrawal was announced in 1968 by British. The super 
power rivalry in this region gained momentum after British 
withdrawal .United States was involved into Gulf politics 
for the containment of Soviet expansionist policy. The 
erstwhile Soviet Union came to Gulf region for lessening 
the influence of USA and to make interruption in supply of 
oil to the western world. 
The first and foremost interest of US in the region 
is oil. The region was considered important for 
containment policy of USA against USSR. For gaining 
control and foothold in the region USA got a number of 
military bases to protect the region from Soviet Union's 
infl uence. The US military involvement in the Persian 
Gulf crisis 1990-91 revolved around the security of oil 
supply for it and for its allies. Nevertheless the region 
would be much more significant to US for its oil resources 
in the years to come. 
The Persian Gulf, being adjoining to erstwhile USSR 
had remained geo-politically and strategically important 
to it. In this context, USSR had acquired some military 
bases in the area to control the sea-lanes against USA. In 
the past the interests of Soviet Union could be matched 
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with the political, economic and strategic interests of US 
and its western allies in West Asia particularly in the 
Persian Gulf region. 
The political scenario of the region have been full 
of conflicts and tensions. The tensions are mainly due to 
the various territorial and island disputes in the region. 
These regional conflicts among the states of the region 
are more likely to threaten the security of the Gulf than 
direct conflict between the super powers over their stakes 
within the region. The regional conflicts in the Gulf are 
multifaceted, overlap each other, interlock with conflicts 
in continguous zones, intervene with domestic crises and 
interplay with domestic differences. The regional 
conflicts will continue to interplay with global problems 
and issues. The outside powers have been involved in one 
way or other on the side of their client states in the 
numerous territorial and island disputes in the region. 
During the last couple of years the Gulf region has 
faced several territorial and island disputes which 
threaten the security of the region. 
The most prominent feature of these disputes was the 
quest for a new security system in the region under the 
slogan of New World Order. In quest for new order, the most 
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positive developments were the number of bilateral 
security pacts signed by most of Persian Gulf states with 
western powers particularly with United States. 
At the regional level, Egypt and Syria are anxious 
to rehabilitate their influence in the region. They 
cultivated some good will in the midst ol" the first & 
second Gulf crisis and were keen to participate in the 
Persian Gulf security system. However, their efforts were 
blunted by the GCC States, particularly Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. 
After the Gulf war, Egypt showed interest for 
normalizing of its relation with Iran but the latter did 
not reciprocate. Therefore, Egypt concentrated its efforts 
on promoting its influence among the GCC states. 
The attitudes of the external powers like the US, 
the UK and the France were significant. Although having 
bilateral security pacts with GCC states, all the western 
states maintained neutrality in their disputes. They 
advised their Gulf partners not only to resolve their 
disputes peacefully between themselves but also cautioned 
them not to use force. The United States was the single 
country to which some of the Arab sheikhs and the GCC as a 
whole looked for succour. 
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The US/Western approach on the territorial disputes 
was different from Kuwait-Iraq crisis. The basic US 
interest in the region is to ensure hold over oil 
resources irrespective of the host states conflicting 
claims to oil-producing or oil-bearing territories. The 
United States seems confident of managing the 
liiLia-.o[;ionaL disputes through a wide spectrum oC means 
available. The United States and its allies do not want 
another territorial conflict to be resolved by use of 
force among the states, particularly their own camp-
followers in the region. 
The territorial and island disputes between the 
states of Gulf region are product of history, they 
resurrected in the midst of the shapping of a new 
international and regional power equilibrium since last 
few years. Economic and strategic considerations too are 
deriving force for the conflict in the Persian Gulf 
region. The prospects of peace, security and stability do 
not seem to be assuring due to the disputes and 
conflicts among the states of the region. The territories 
have been constant source of conflict among the states of 
the region. United Nations oftenly involved to settle 
these disputes which threaten the regional security. 
Iran-Iraq war and recent Gulf crisis is based on the 
territorial disputes, which have greatly challenged the 
authority of United Nations. 
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The Iran - Iraq war showed an almost insurmountable 
challenge to the United Nations conflict resolution 
capability to maintain peace and security in the Gulf 
region. The United Nations found itself in a very 
challenging and difficult position during the war period 
between Iran and Iraq. The United Nations showed its 
ineffectiveness and weakness in the course of war in 
which both the countries were involved by all their 
military capability. 
The Iran - Iraq war which started in September 1980 
and continued till August 1988 has brought a very serious 
threat to the security and stability in the Persian gulf 
region as well as to world peace. The United Nations 
authority, prestige and sanctity was at stake during war. 
Since the outbreak of the conflict between the two 
states, different international organizations had made 
number of attempts to stop the war, but the United 
Nations was in a commanding position, and peace 
initiatives were started by United Nations. The conflict 
between Iran and Iraq had several times been considered 
by United Nations at various and different levels since 
it started in September 1980. In this co ntext the 
Security Council adopted, and passed a number of 
resolutions to end the conflict. Lastly, on July 20, 
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1987, the Rcsoiution 598, was passed by Security Council 
as the final instrument that brought to an end of the 
eight years conflict between them. 
This eight years long conflict took toll on the 
capability of United Nations to control the conflict. 
I'he peace making machinery proved itself ineffective and 
weak in stopping the war between both the countries. All 
the proposals and resolutions till July 20, 1987, passed 
by Security Council showed its ineffectiveness and 
inability in restoring and maintaining peace and security 
in the Gulf region. 
However, invariably in course of war, various 
resolutions, proposals, reports and despatches presented 
by UN did not appear as to respresent significant and 
important contribution to end the conflict and to restore 
and maintain peace and security in the region. 
The attempts and efforts made by United Nations 
also failed in certain cases due to entrenched position 
taken by both the countries.UN's efforts to settle the 
disputes have also been obstructed by super powers for 
their own objective and interest. 
Thus the United Nations showed its inability and 
limitations during the course of war to resolve the 
problem under its Charter framework. 
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The Gulf crisis 1990-91 can be considered as a 
major and unique crisis after the end of the cold war. It 
highlighted several appearances and issues to be 
seriously thought as far as the functions and role of 
international organizations. The crisis has posed a 
serious threat and challenge to the role of United 
Nations for making peace and security in the region as 
well as in West Asia. 
The United Nations response to the Iraq - Kuwait 
conflict situation is, in an actual sense, unprecedented 
in the entire history of world organization. Not that 
this was the first and single case where United Nations 
attempted to set right a wrong committed by one member 
state against another. No other conflict situation in the 
course of more than four-and-a-half decades of the 
existence of United Nations has occasioned so vigorous 
and so frequent resort to the Charter framework for the 
collective enforcement of international peace and 
security as the Persian Gulf situation has in 1990-91. 
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait represented a most 
balatant challenge to the body of rules governing 
inter-state behaviour, as laid down in the United Nations 
charter, viz., settlement of international disputes 
through peaceful means, non-use of force, respect for 
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each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, etc. 
So, this is not to say,again that Iraq was first and only 
country to have committed a gross violation of the 
Charter principles. 
In course of Gulf crisis the United Nations had 
played a\i unprecedented role. It showed its weakness and 
inability to resolve the conflict within the Charter 
framework. The UN Charter did not envision the United 
States to make foreign policy decisions nor did it 
envision the implementation of those decisions. This kind 
of solution arrived at in the UN would certainly weaken 
the UN and its credibility. It has potential implications 
for future UN peace keeping operations in the face of 
military threat. These developments make one re-think 
about the role that UN played in this crisis. 
Throughout the period of crisis the Security 
Council did not meet to discuss the situation except in a 
few close-door meetings. The first public meeting, on the 
subject since the war, was convened on March 2, 1991 to 
considere the US drafted Resolution 686. The resolution 
never declared a formal ceasefire nor did it order 
multinational troops out of Iraq or lift sanctions 
against Baghdad, though Kuwait was liberated. This was 
clear indication that the war aims of US&its allies were 
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not only the Liberation of Kuwait, but in fact the 
destruction of Iraq's military potentiality and control 
over oil. 
The US seemed to have exploited the Security 
Council and UN Charter as tool to serve its national 
interests abroad. The United Nations was used as a tool 
for its foreign policy goals. It is very clear that UN 
had no control over the course of military operation in 
the Gulf crisis. It was USA which actually had control 
over whole military operation. With the breakup of the 
Soviet Union as an effective deterrent to the US, the 
latter emerged as supreme international actor in new 
international order. In fact the UN has been hi-jacked 
by United States and its allies in the Gulf crisis. 
The Third World was critical of the regretful role 
of UN in the whole episode. It was deaf and dumb, limp 
and lifeless - a rubber stamp in the hands of the major 
powers of the world. Thus, the role of United Nations in 
the Gulf crisis was extremely formal but the actual and 
real role was played by United States. 
The prominent role of UN was helpful but by no 
means anticipated feature of the crisis during its 
initial stages, and a formidable coalition could have 
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been built out side of it, although its role was 
significant domestically in all western countries. This 
role was made possible by active cooperation of Soviet 
Union with the west. 
In the post Gulf Crisis, the general world opinion 
is that the UN was used and abused strictly on the terms 
set by the western nations and specially by the United 
States. All their actions were based on the pretext of 
renovating the United Nations. 
The UN as an international organization working for 
international peace and security should not surrender 
itself to the will of any v^ rld pov/er or allcvj itslef to be 
used as an instrument for achieving some self interest of 
that power. The UN will has to play its role reflecting 
the wishes of international community. The UN will and 
not the desire of other power should prevail to restore 
and maintain international peace and security. It is in 
the interest of both of developed and developing 
countries that the UN would be entrusted with the task of 
international peace and security rather than unilateral 
action by one member or group of countries to settle a 
dispute outside the UN Charter framework. In this 
context the role of United Nations in the Gulf politics 
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is appreciable and admirable specially in the Gulf crisis 
by exercising the authority and sanctity of the UN 
Charter since its formation in 1945. 
In an overall analysis, the role of the United 
Nations for making international peace and security today 
seems to be in danger of losing its credibility as an 
international organization which demands it to respect 
the will of all the memebr states. The UN should change 
itself in consonance with the world development. It 
should have to improve by democratizing itself according 
to the will of international community. Moreover in the 
post cold war world, democracy and freedom are becoming 
the guiding principles of international politics, the 
international organization must assimilate those 
principles in concrete terms by enlarging the permanent 
membership of the Security Council. Today, the political, 
economic and social climate has changed around the world 
and the imperatives that led to the establishment of the 
UN were entirely different from what they are today. The 
end of the cold war was supposed to have ended the state 
of paralysis of the UN. Today, in this new world order it 
is the will of the stronger that prevails. Therefore, 
there is need for restructuring of UN to help it play its 
due role. Perhaps, in this respect in the changing world 
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and new international order the United Nations is in a 
Search of a role, thereby it could play an appreciable 
role for world peace and security in this unipolar world. 
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